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Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles:
Germany and the United States Contrasted
Part 1. Introduction. 1 Germany’s Basic Law 2 assigns primary jurisdiction over
constitutional issues 3 to Germany’s Constitutional Court4 and requires other courts to
suspend their proceedings and refer constitutional issues that are critical to resolution of
any pending case to the Constitutional Court.5 In the United States, the Supreme Court
has broad appellate and, in some cases, original jurisdiction 6 and its authority to review
legislative action for conflict with the Constitution became clear early in the Court’s
history. 7 Unlike Germany, however, lower courts also have jurisdiction to decide
constitutional issues, subject of course to eventual Supreme Court review. 8

1

The tax law report for the XVIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law scheduled
for July 2006 complements this article and provide a broader comparative review of constitutional tax law.
The author of this article and general reporter for the tax program for the Congress designed the congress
topic: Restricting the Legislative Power to Tax: Intersections of Taxation and Constitutional Law.
(Program available at http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/index1.asp). For the national report from the
United States that addresses some of the issues this article raises, see Tracy Kaye and Stephen Mazza,
Restricting the Legislative Power to Tax, Am. J. of Comparative Law (2005).
2
Das Grundgesetz in German. The term “Basic Law” tends to alternate with “Constitution” in the
literature. The Basic Law serves the functions in Germany of the Constitution in the United States with the
material difference that the procedure for amending the Basic Law is simpler than the emendation
procedure for the U.S. Constitution. Compare Art 79 of the Basic Law that requires a two-thirds majority
in each house of parliament to change the Basic Law with the US procedure under Article 5 of the U.S.
Constitution requiring ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures (or the electorates of threefourths of the states). On the other hand, the Basic Law permits no amendments to Articles 1-20 that
describe the basic rights although clarification and embellishment is permissible. Art. 146 anticipates that
Germany eventually will adopt a constitution that will replace the Basic Law. Except as noted to the
contrary, the English language text of quotations is from Press and Information Office of the Federal
Government, BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Christian Tomuschat & David Curry,
trans) (1998).
3
Art. 93 of the Basic Law also gives the constitutional court authority to resolve conflicts between federal
and state law and between the laws of different states.
4
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in German. While the German Constitutional Court publishes its
decisions, it does not disclose the names of the parties to the case as U.S. decisions do. Hence, German
decisions become known by their citations or by some characteristic of the case. Customary citation form
in Germany that this Article follows is “BVerfGE” (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court)
followed by a volume number and a page number.
5
Art 100 establishes the referral process and requires the court involved to suspend the proceedings until
the federal constitutional court resolves the constitutional issue. The Basic Law requires referral only if the
constitutional issue is critical to the outcome of the case.
6
U.S. Constitution Art. III, Sec. 2.
7
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the Supreme Court’s power to review
legislative acts for constitutionality).
8
Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule 10 (2005) provides discretionary Supreme Court review
of a decision of a U.S. Court of Appeals or the highest court of any state by writ of certiorari.
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While the U.S. Supreme Court has resolved many tax controversies, 9 with
taxpayers raising constitutional questions in a number of cases addressing questions of
federal tax law, 10 only infrequently has the Court found a federal taxing statute to violate
a constitutionally protected right or privilege. 11 Rarely has the Supreme Court looked to
the Constitution and decided that a federal tax law violated the Constitution.12 Never has
the Supreme Court held a federal tax law to conflict with the Bill of Rights. 13 Many
more decisions involve challenges to state tax statutes as in conflict with the U.S.
Constitution. 14 Often those state law cases combine claims under several provisions of
the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause, 15 Due Process, 16 and Equal
Protection. 17 In reviewing state tax statutes for compliance with constitutional standards,
the Court consistently has applied its rational basis test, its least intrusive standard of
review. 18 Under that test, a statute is valid so long as the legislature has a rational basis

9

A recently assembled database identifies xxx Supreme Court decisions in federal tax matters during the
years 1913 – 2000. Nancy Staudt and Peter Wiedenbeck’s Supreme Court Tax Database (soon to be
published on http://law.wustl.edu). The overall database seeks to identify all Supreme Court decisions
addressing federal taxes during the years 1913 – 2000 and omits decisions addressing state taxes.
10
Id (identifying 157 decisions in which the Court addressed Constitutional questions in resolving the
federal tax issue. I am grateful to professors Staudt and Wiedenbeck for making the constitutional
decisions’ portion of the database available to me to use in this project. The total number of decisions is
somewhat greater than 157, as the version of the database I used missed a few cases, including those cited
in notes 152 and 153 infra. See discussion infra in Part 3.
11
Id. The database discloses only 17 decisions in which the taxpayer won (some only partially) and several
of those cases were criminal cases involving the issue of self-incrimination.
12
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (determining that the 16th Amendment permits Congress to tax
only realized gain); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (limiting retroactive application of the estate
tax on foreseeability grounds).
13
Amendments 1 through 9 of the U.S. Constitution protecting certain basic rights and individual liberties
including freedom of speech, assembly and religion. On the history of the Bill of Rights generally, see
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 (1991).
14
No one has compiled a database of these decisions so there number is less certain than for decisions
involving federal taxing statutes.
15
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, …” Implicit in the grant of power
to the federal government is the denial to the states of the power to burden interstate commerce, through
discriminatory taxation, for example. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. PSC, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (2005).
16
U.S. Constitution Amendment 5. The Due Process Clause reads in part: “No person shall … be deprived
of … property, without due process of law….” U.S. Const. Amend. 14 applies the requirement of “due
process” to the states: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process or law.”
17
U.S. Const. Amend. 14. last clause. The Equal Protection Clause reads in part: “nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The Equal Protection clause is not part of the Fifth
Amendment and the Supreme Court has held that it does not apply to the United States. Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (upholding the Constitutionality of the Social Security Act). The
courts have determined that the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment must be read into the 5th
Amendment, supra note 16 (quoting the relevant part) so that the provision applies to the United States as
well as the states. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (dictum stating that equal
protection analysis under the 5th Amendment to be the same as under the 14th Amendment).
18
See discussion infra in Part 3B.
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for its enactment. 19 The decisions predominantly uphold the state taxing statute.
Occasionally, the Court limits states’ taxing power 20 or their tax collection authority over
non-residents. 21
The German Constitutional Court, on the other hand, has rendered many decisions
in tax controversies on constitutional grounds. 22 Those constitutional tax decisions have
played and continue to play a meaningful and ongoing role in shaping tax law and
administration in Germany. 23 The Constitutional Court employs a more exacting
standard of review than rational basis and requires a compelling justification for
legislation that results in any distributional inequalities causing like taxpayers to pay
unequal amounts of tax.24 In Germany, constitutional protections of individual liberties
have rendered unconstitutional such matters as mandatory joint assessment of married
couples, 25 retroactive application of rate increases, 26 deductibility of political
contributions, 27 value-based taxes that do not apply the same valuation standard to all
properties, 28 and income taxation of the subsistence minimum, 29 and, quite recently, a tax
that the government was unable in practice to assess and collect uniformly.30

19

Western and Southern Life Insurance Company v. State Board of Equalization of California, 451 U.S.
648 (1981) (holding a retaliatory state tax to be rationally related to the state’s proper objectives). See
discussion infra in text accompanying note 259.
20
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989)
(prohibiting non-uniform assessment of tax on real property); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (prohibiting taxing real estate of camp for non-residents of state while
exempting real estate of camps for residents).
21
National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (limiting the state’s power to
impose collection responsibility for use taxes on non-resident vendors with no substantial presence in the
state).
22
A database similar to the Staudt and Wiedenbeck database, supra note 9, is not available for the German
decisions. However, the website for the university library at Marburg, http://www.ub.unimarburg.de/fachinfo/infjur03.html, discloses that there is a looseleafed, reference work for the decisions of
the German Constitutional Court, NACHSCHLAGEWERK DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS.
23
Decisions of Constitutional Court, however, have had little impact upon the structure and administration
of the turnover tax (Umsatzsteuer) in Germany although the federal government raises roughly one-half of
all its tax revenue through the value added tax. See, Bundesreferat I A 6, ERGEBNIS DER 122. SITZUNG DES
ARBEITSKREISES “STEUERSCHÄTZUNGEN” VOM-4. BIS 6.-NOVEMBER-2003 IN FRANKFURT for statistics on
distribution of collections. The turnover tax is substantially the same as a value added tax. This Article
addresses the absence of constitutional decisions concerning the value added tax infra in Part 4F infra.
24
BVerfGE 6, 55 (January 17, 1957), discussed infra in part 4B.
25
Id.
26
BVerfGE 13, 261, 271 (Dec. 19, 1961, 2d Senate), BVerfGE 13, 274 (December 19, 1961, 2d Senate)
and BVerfGE 13, 279 (December 19, 1961, 2d Senate).
27
BVerfGE 6, 273 (February 21, 1957) and BVerfGE 8, 51 (June 24, 1958).
28
BVerfGE 93, 121 (June 22, 1995, 2d Senate) (holding the wealth tax, as applied to violate the equality
principle); BVerfGE 93, 165 (June 22, 1995, 2d Senate) (likewise the inheritance tax), discussed infra in
Part 4E.
29
BVerfGE 82, 60 (May 29, 1990), discussed infra in part 4A.
30
BVerfGE 110, 94 (March 9, 2004, 2d Senate), discussed infra in part 4C.
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While the provisions protecting individual liberties and relationships are more
extensive and detailed in the German constitution31 than in the United States
constitution, 32 that distinction may be one without a material difference. Both
constitutions protect substantially identical groups of human rights, including speech,
assembly, religion, personal dignity, racial equality and so forth. 33 Yet, the United States
constitution has played at best an incidental and only indirect role in the development of
U.S. tax law. 34
This Article explores how the German Constitutional Court and the United States
Supreme Court approach constitutionally based arguments in their tax decisions. The
Article focuses its attention primarily on distributional fairness in taxation. Most cases
involving fairness issues address the equal rights guarantees in Germany 35 and the
corresponding equal protection under U.S. law 36 or apply the rule of law provision of the
German constitution 37 corresponding to the due process concept in the U.S. 38 The article
seeks to develop hypotheses to account for the differences in approach and outcome in
the two courts. 39
Part 2 of the Article introduces the basic tax equality concepts of horizontal and
vertical equity and, in providing a brief overview comparing German and U.S. taxing
structures, observes that neither system protects vertical equity (although Germany
compensates in part for regressivity through its protected subsistence minima). 40 Part 3
examines the U.S cases that address or resolve constitutional arguments under the U.S.
Constitution. Part 3 emphasizes tax decisions applying the Bill of Rights and the
31

Art. 1-12, 13 –17, and 20 describe and guarantee certain basic rights and liberties and include the
protections found in the Bill of Rights, Amendments 1-9 of the U.S. Constitution.
32
Amendments 1-9. 13-15 to the U.S. Constitution.
33
Art. 3 of the Basic Law guarantees equal rights without regard to sex in Germany. The U.S. constitution
provides no similar protection but statutes and court decisions do. While a proposed amendment to the
U.S. constitution failed to gather the approval of sufficient states to make it part of the constitution, U.S.
Supreme Court decisions have applied equal protection analysis in striking down statutes that discriminated
against women, for example, Frontiero v Richardson, 417 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that requiring service
women to establish their husband’s dependency but not requiring husband’s to do so with respect to their
wives was unconstitutional), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding that the Social
Security Act discriminated against women who left surviving husbands and dependent children).
34
See, generally, Boris I. Bittker and Martin J. McMahon, Jr., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS ¶1.1 (1988).
35
Article 3 of the Basic Law.
36
U.S. Const. Amend. 14, Section 1. This amendment by its terms does not apply to the federal
government but only to the states. Nevertheless, the courts have applied the equal protection principle to
the federal government as well, supra note 17. William B. Lockhart et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES—
COMMENTS—QUESTIONS at 1202 (1991).
37
The principle of the rule of law (das Rechtstaatprinzip) flows from Art. 20 of the Basic Law: “[t]he
Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. (Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist
ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat.)
38
U.S. Const. Amend. V and as applied to the states through Amendment 14, Section 1.
39
Victor Thuronyi, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW 64-100 (The Hague 2003) (“Thuronyi” in the following) lays
a foundation for comparative constitutional law study of taxation and discusses briefly the major German
and U.S. cases.
40
See discussion infra Part 4A.
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Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Part 3A describes a few taxpayer successes
in non-Bill of Rights cases. Part 3B highlights how the Supreme Court rejects taxpayers’
claims under the Bill of Rights in federal tax cases. Part 3C turns to taxpayers’
challenges to state tax laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Part 3D complements the
discussion of the Equal Protection cases in Part 3C with some of the Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause decisions where the Court tends toward a stricter equality standard.
Part 3E reviews issues relating to the federal government’s power to tax state activity and
vice versa. A brief Part 3F glances at the screening process by which the Court insulates
itself from “frivolous” constitutional arguments. Part 4 discusses decisions of the
German Constitutional Court under the German Basic Law’s due process, equal
protection, human dignity and social state provisions. More specifically, Part 4A traces
the constitutional jurisprudence limiting the power of the legislature to tax the subsistence
minimum as a matter of equality and protection of human dignity. Part 4B examines the
decisions that interdict marriage penalties on the bases of equality and protection of
marriage principles. Part 4C describes and discusses the recent decision mandating
practical ability to assess and collect a tax as a condition to its imposition on equality
principle grounds. Part 4D looks to the Constitutional Court’s approach to retroactive
taxation under rule of law principles. Part 4E observes direct application of the equality
principle to the Wealth and Inheritance Taxes. Part 4F reviews some Turnover Tax cases
to demonstrate that horizontal equity in the turnover tax is required but vertical equity is
not. Part 5 offers hypotheses to explain the reasons for the greater receptivity to
constitutional challenges in the German Constitutional Court relative to the United States
Supreme Court. 41
Part 2. Overview comparison of the German and U.S. taxing structures. German tax
legislation is predominantly federal. While the Basic Law reserves revenues from certain
taxing sources to the states and municipalities 42 and permits the states and municipalities
to legislate in specific areas, 43 in practice, taxing legislation is federal. State and local
legislatures can set some tax rates where federal legislation authorizes them to do so.44
The principal taxes, income, 45 company, 46 and turnover, 47 respectively, are federal taxes
41

The Article will not address the relationship between Germany and the other members of the European
Union or ongoing efforts to harmonize taxation throughout the European Union.
42
Basic Law Art. 106.
43
Basic Law Art. 105.
44
For example, section 25 of the Real Property Tax Law of 1973 (Aug. 8, 1973, as amended through
December 12, 2000) [GrStG 1973, §25] (available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/grstg_1973/index.html)specifically authorizes the communities to
establish the rate of tax, and to fix any increase from the previous calendar year no later than June 30 of any
year.
45
The Income Tax Law, version of Oct. 19, 2002, as amended through June 6, 2005 [Das
Einkommensteuergesetz (Neugefasst durch Bek. v. 19.10.2002 I 4210, (2003 I 179), zuletzt geändert durch
28 G v. 21. 6.2005 I 1818)] (EStG followed by a section number in the following) (available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/estg/index.html).
46
The Company Tax Law of 1977, version of Oct. 15, 2002, as amended through December 12, 2004 [Das
Körperschaftsteuergesetz 1977 (Neugefaßt durch Bek. v. 15.10.2002 I 4144, zuletzt geändert durch Art. 4
G v. 15.12.2004 I 3416)] (KStG followed by a section number in the following) (available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/kstg_1977/index.html). The customary translation of the
Körperschaftsteuer is the corporate tax but that seems an insufficient description for a reader in the U.S., as
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that the Basic Law requires the federal government to share with the states 48 and the
states to share with the municipalities. 49 The income and company taxes are direct
taxes 50 on the income of individuals in the case of the income tax 51 and the income of
companies in the case of the company tax. 52 Most tax commentators consider the
turnover tax to be an indirect tax. 53 Its base is the value of goods or services and the
taxable event is delivery of goods or services for compensation. 54 The statute allows a
credit for the turnover tax paid earlier in the delivery process if the taxpayer received the
goods or services for further distribution. 55 Accordingly, the burden of the turnover tax
falls upon the ultimate consumer because the tax becomes part of the price. 56 The
turnover tax is a consumption tax like the value added tax 57 and comparable to sales taxes
common to almost all states in the United States.58
By comparison, the United States integrates its individual and corporate income
taxes into a single taxing structure under the Internal Revenue Code. 59 Nevertheless, the
the tax reaches all German limited liability entities as well, including the most common entity, the
Gemeinschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (limited liability company). KStG § 1. Under U.S. tax law,
limited liability entities are tax transparent (tax conduits) under subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended (the “Code”).
47
The Turnover Tax Law of 1980, version of February 2, 2005 [Das Umsatzsteuergesetz 1980 (Neugefasst
durch Bek. v. 21.2.2005 I 386)] (UStG followed by a section number in the following) (available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/ustg_1980/index.html).
48
Basic Law Art. 106, Para. 3.
49
Id. Para. 5a.
50
A tax is direct if the party who pays the tax also bears the burden of the tax. While an income tax is a
classical direct tax, considerable disagreement concerning corporate income taxes arises because many
economists argue that entities shift the burden of the tax to their customers through product and service
pricing. Absent competition from non-taxable sellers and service providers, neither the entity, through
decreased profits, nor its owners would bear the incidence of the entity level tax. Interestingly, that
argument overstates the point, as even individuals who provide goods or services arguably could pass the
incidence of income taxes on to their customers through higher prices so long as there is no non-taxable
competition. Compare Thuronyi, supra note 39, at 54-7.
51
See, generally, Klaus Tipke & Joachim Lang, STEUERRECHT, Ch. 9 (17th ed. Köln 2002) (“Tipke/Lang”
in the following).
52
Id. Ch. 11.
53
Id. Ch. 14.
54
UStG, supra note 47, § 1.
55
Id. § 15.
56
See, generally, Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at 555.
57
Value added taxes generally are imposes at each step in a distribution process on the increase in value
that the taxable step adds. Customarily, the taxing statute either subtracts vendor’s purchase price from the
vendor’s resale price and subjects that remainder to the tax or computes the tax on the vendor’s resale price
and subtracts the value added tax paid earlier in the process. Thus, for example, a manufacturer buys raw
materials that were subject to the value added tax and transforms them into a finished good. It is the
increased value of the finished good over the raw material that is the subject of the tax.
58
Sales taxes are also consumption taxes but differ from value added taxes as the taxable event is the
purchase by the end user. The vendor collects the tax at point of sale by adding the tax to the sale price.
Sales for resale are exempt from the tax. For example, see § 144.010 R.S.Mo. (defining sales at retail) and
§ 144.020 R.S.Mo. (imposing the tax on sellers engaged in the business of selling at retail).
59
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code” or “IRC” followed by a section number in
the following), is Title 26 of the United States Code. Chapter 1 of the Code unifies the treatment of all
income-based taxes, both individual and entity.
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distinction between one taxing statute and two is insignificant. 60 The Code applies one
set of rates to individuals 61 and a different set to corporations. 62 Numerous other
differences between the rules applicable to individuals and those applicable to
corporations permeate chapter 1 of the Code. For example, differing rules apply to
various classes of deductions for individuals, but not corporations, as all corporate
deductions are fundamentally trade or business deductions; 63 individuals receive an
allowance for personal exemptions and corporations do not; 64 and a reduced rate of tax
applies to individual’s long term capital gains. 65 The German company income tax has a
much broader reach than does the U.S. corporate income tax. All corporations in
Germany are subject to tax at corporate level,66 while corporations meeting specific
ownership requirements in the U.S. may elect tax transparency, so that their owners are
subject to tax on the entities’ income rather than the entities themselvees.67 The German
tax applies as well to all entities that enjoy any form of limited liability, including limited
liability companies 68 and limited partnerships on shares. 69 Most similar entities in the
United States such as limited liability companies and limited partnerships are transparent
for federal income tax purposes but may elect to be taxed as corporations. 70
60

A more significant difference lies in the administration of the tax, the United States relies on selfassessment, IRC § 6011, while the tax collector assesses all taxes in Germany. See, generally, Roman Seer,
BESTEUERUNGSVERFAHREN: RECHTSVERGLEICH USA-DEUTSCHLAND 51-58 (Heidelberg 2002), for a brief
explanation of the German assessment system.
61
IRC §1.
62
IRC §11.
63
IRC § 62 applies only to individuals and allows certain deductions for individuals as adjustments to gross
income, while other deductions are itemized deductions allowable in determining taxable income under
IRC § 63 and allowable only if the individual elects to itemize. Individuals itemize if the deductions
allowable under IRC § 63 exceed in the aggregate the standard deduction amount under IRC § 63(c).
Corporations’ deductions are allowable in arriving at taxable income under § 63 with no election to itemize
and no standard deduction as an alternative.
64
IRC § 151.
65
IRC § 1(h).
66
KStG § 1.
67
Subchapter S of the Code, IRC §1361 et seq. Corporations that may elect to be S corporations would not
operate in corporate form in Germany at all. Most likely they would be limited liability companies
(Gemeinschaften mit beschränkter Haftung) with stock companies (other than limited partnerships on
shares – Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien) being only large, publicly traded entities in Germany.
68
German limited liability companies are Gemeinschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH). While they
are statutory entities in Germany as they are in the U.S., federal law authorizes and governs them in
Germany. See, generally the Law governing Limited Liability Companies of Aug. 1, 1986, most recently
amended July 19, 2002 (GmbHG in the following).
69
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien.
70
Subchapter K of the Code, IRC § 701 et seq. governs partnerships, both general and limited, and provides
for full tax transparency so that the entities’ owners are taxable on their shares of the entities’ income and
the entities are not taxable. Treas. reg. § 301.7701-3 (2002) classifies U.S. limited liability companies as
partnerships for federal income tax purposes but classifies most foreign limited liability entities as
associations taxable as corporations for U. S. tax purposes. U.S. partnerships and limited liabilities may
elect to be associations taxable as corporations, and foreign limited liability companies, including the
German GmbH, may elect to be partnerships for U.S. tax purposes. Treas. reg. § 301.7701-3(c).
Partnerships and limited liability companies that are publicly traded and engage in the active conduct of
business rather than investment activities are treated as corporations for tax purposes. IRC § 7704. Treas.
reg. §301.7701-2, 3 resolved the classification issue in the U.S. The issue has a fascinating history in the
© Copyright 2005 Henry Ordower
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Although at times some legislators and tax theoreticians have proposed enactment
of a national consumption tax, 71 the United States has no national consumption tax. 72
Most states, however, impose a consumption tax in the form of a sales 73 or gross receipts
tax 74 on the sale of goods for consumption in the state. Sales of goods by an in-state
vendor for delivery outside the state generally are exempt from the tax. 75 States having a
sales type tax impose a complementary use tax in order to tax the consumption in the
state of goods transported into the state for consumption that were not subject to sales tax
in another jurisdiction. 76 With the exception of telecommunications services, 77 states
generally impose no consumption-based tax on rendition of services within the state. 78
Accordingly, incidence of a consumption tax in the U.S. is far narrower than in Germany.
In addition, the states determine their own rates of tax on sales, 79 so that the rates are not
uniform as the rate is under the German turnover tax. 80
Vertical equity principles 81 complement fundamental horizontal equity
assumptions 82 in both the German and U.S. income tax systems and underlie structural
U.S. See, generally, William S. McKee, William F. Nelson & Robert L. Whitmire, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶3.06-3.07 (1996).
71
Currently pending before Congress is a proposal to replace the Internal Revenue Code with a single,
national sales tax. Fair Tax Act of 2003, H.R. 25 (108th Cong. 1st Sess). See William G. Gale, The
National Retail Sales Tax: What Would The Rate Have To Be?, 107 TAX NOTES 889 (2005) (explaining
the tax base and presenting economic data critical of the proposal). See, generally, Rethinking the Tax
Code, Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee (108th Cong. 1st Sess) (Nov. 11, 2003) (includes
statements promoting and opposing the value added tax); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of
Tax, 103 MICHIGAN L. REV. 807 (2005) (discussing consumption taxes); John K. McNulty, Flat Tax,
Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy
Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000) (discussing various proposals for
reform, including a value added tax).
72
See discussion infra in note 168 concerning whether a national consumption tax might be
unconstitutional as a prohibited direct tax.
73
Only Alaska, Montana, New Hampshire and Oregon do not impose a general, statewide sales tax or
equivalent. 2003 ALL STATES TAX HANDBOOK ¶210 (2003).
74
Illinois uses a retail occupation tax model and Delaware a gross receipts model. Id.
75
12 CSR 10-3.888 (2005) (delivery outside the state exempt from sales tax if buyer claims exemption).
76
2003 ALL STATES TAX HANDBOOK, supra note 73, ¶210
77
Most states impose a tax on telecommunication services. Id. at ¶259.
78
Exceptions exist for services of altering or installing a product but the imposition of the tax is not
uniform from state to state. Id. at ¶253 shows a lack of uniformity in taxation of leasing of goods, ¶254
repair and installation, and ¶255-A for alterations.
79
For those states that impose a statewide sales tax, rates range from Colorado’s low of 2.9% to
California’s high of 7.25%. California includes a uniform 1.25% local tax while other states have varying
local sales taxes in addition to the statewide tax. Thus, Mississippi and Rhode Island share the high end at
a state level tax of 7%. Id. at ¶250.
80
UStG § 12. Uniformity of consumption tax in Germany diminishes as local governments impose
specialized consumption taxes on consumption of beverages, amusements, including hunting and fishing,
ownership of dogs, etc. Basic Law Art 105, Para. 2a authorizes these local taxes.
81
Vertical equity is a means concept -- the greater the taxpayer’s means as measured by income, the greater
the share of the overall income tax burden the taxpayer should bear. Richard A. Westin, WG&L TAX
DICTIONARY at 835 (2000). In its tax decisions, the German Constitutional Court remains mindful of
vertical, as well as horizontal, equity principles. For example, BVerfGE 82, 60, supra note 29, at 89.
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decisions that lead to an expressed, although not necessarily an actual, preference for
progressive taxation in both countries. 83 While progressive taxation is the
disproportional increase in taxpayers’ tax burdens as those taxpayers’ wealth and
incomes increase, 84 this Article addresses progressivity relative to income, rather than
wealth, 85 as it discusses the combined effect of income and consumption taxes. Thus,
increasing tax rates as a taxpayer’s amount of income increases signals the presence of
progressive taxation. 86 Both German and U.S. personal income taxes employ graduated
rate structures with positive rates in Germany ranging from a minimum of just over 16%
(0% if one views capital gain as income) to a maximum of 45% (a 29% range) 87 and in
the U.S. from a minimum of 10% to a maximum of 35% on ordinary income 88 and, with
exceptions for certain categories of net capital gain, 89 a minimum of 5 percent 90 to a
82

Horizontal equity requires that identically situated taxpayers bear identical shares of the tax burden.
Westin, supra note 81, at 338. Horizontal equity is conceptually neutral with respect to progression or
regression in taxation.
83
Progressive taxation injects vertical equity into the tax system by imposing a greater proportional tax
burden, customarily through graduated rates, on taxpayers with greater incomes. For a concise discussion
of progressive taxation in the U.S., see Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., THE UNEASY CASE FOR
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (Chicago 1953, revised 1963). See for Germany, Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at
113 identifying the principle of redistribution of wealth through progressive taxation as a function of the
social state principle, Basic Law Art. 20, rather than the equality principle, Basic Law Art. 3, that requires
equal taxation of like situated taxpayers. And for an excellent overview of the literature and problems with
progressive taxation debate, see Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 919 (1997).
84
Blum & Kalven, UNEASY CASE, supra note 83, at 4.
85
U.S. federal gift and estate taxes, chapters 25 and 20 of the Code respectively, are examples of taxes that
are fundamentally progressive relative to wealth. Relative to income, however, both the gift and estate
taxes may be regressive for several reasons. Gifts are excludable from the gross income of the recipient
under IRC §102. Gifts of appreciated property from higher income tax bracket taxpayers to lower bracket
taxpayers draw less income tax upon sale of the property than they would have if the higher bracket
taxpayer sold the property because the donee becomes taxable on the gain. The donee takes the donor’s
adjusted basis in the property under IRC §1015 for purposes of determining the donee’s gain. Gifts at
death, however, eliminate the taxation of all historical gain in the property, as the donee’s adjusted basis
becomes the fair market value of the property at the date of the donor’s death (or the alternate valuation
date) under IRC §1014.
86
Westin, supra note 81, at 555.
87
EStG § 32a. Rates in Germany climb both in steps and in a linear progression that is a function of the
amount by which a taxpayer’s income exceeds the zero rate or exempt amount (Grundfreibetrag). For an
explanation of the rate structure, see Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at 426-27. Each taxpayer enjoys a basic
zero bracket on the initial € 7,664 of income. While the statute employs the same terminology (Freibetrag
– exempt amount) for the allowances for dependent children under EStG § 32, for example, those amounts
reduce taxable income under EStG § 2, as do personal exemptions under U.S. tax law, IRC § 151, and,
accordingly, retard the rate progression. On the other hand, various exclusions from income such as
unemployment compensation, while exempt from tax, count toward determining the rate of tax on the next
euro of income. EStG §32b.
88
IRC § 1(a) – (d), (i). The rates set forth in IRC § 1(i) will return to the rates appearing in IRC § 1(a) after
2010, as provided in Section 901 of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, P.L.
107-16 (107th Cong., 1st Sess. 2001) (EGTRRA in the following).
89
I.R.C. § 1(h) taxes unrecaptured section 1250 gain, defined in I.R.C. § 1(h)(6), at a 25% rate and
collectibles gain, defined in I.R.C. § 1(h)(5)(A), at a 28% rate.
90
I.R.C. § 1202 excludes half the gain on qualified small business stock from gross income (a zero rate)
and taxes the remaining gain at 28%.
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maximum of 15% for net capital gain (a 25% range on ordinary income, but a 35% range
integrating ordinary income and net capital gain). 91 Germany also imposes a 5.5 percent
surtax to support the cost of reunification, 92 but generally does not tax capital gain. 93
Structurally, both the German and the U.S. income taxes appear progressive, as their rates
increase with income.
The U.S. income tax, however, is somewhat more progressive in its rate structure
than the German income tax. 94 Under the German income tax, all income in excess of €
52,152 (€ 104,304 for married individuals electing joint assessment) draws the maximum
45% rate, 95 while under the U.S. rate schedule, the rate brackets are broader and adjust
for inflation 96 so that a married couple filing a joint federal income tax return reaches the
maximum 35% rate on incremental taxable income only in excess of $326,450 for the tax
year 2005. 97 The U.S. does not use a linear progression as Germany does 98 but rather a
series of five rate brackets 99 (six if one counts the zero rate resulting from the combined
effect of personal exemptions 100 and the standard deduction 101 ). Further, the U.S. income
91

IRC § 1(h). This net capital gain provision taxes various types of net capital gain at differing rates
ranging at maximum from 15% to 28%. In addition, the range will narrow to 20-28% as the provisions of
EGTRRA sunset, as set forth supra note 88. IRC §1(h)(11) treats most corporate dividends as an increase
to net capital gain taxed at the lower rates. IRC §1222(11) defines net capital gain as the excess of net long
term capital gains (§1222(7), over net short term capital losses (§1222(6)).
92
Germany added the Solidarity Supplement Law in 1993 and replaced in 1995 (Solidaritätszuschlaggesetz
1995), currently, the applicable version was published October 15, 2002 and amended December 23, 2002.
93
Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at 390. Disposition of income producing property, capital gain, is disposition
of the income source, not income. Thuronyi, supra note 39, at 236-7. In light of the recent Constitutional
Court decision on assessment and collection, BVerfGE 110, 94, supra note 30, discussed infra in part 4C,
even the limited inclusion of capital gains under the German system has become narrower.
94
This observation may be somewhat surprising as one often associates a developed welfare system like
Germany has with tax progression. Germany’s taxes are higher than U.S. taxes so that Germany may
support its welfare system, but they are not necessarily more progressive, just steeply progressive.
95
EStG §32a. Germany does not apply differing rate schedules to married and single individuals, so that
joint assessment under EStG § 26b combines the incomes and then splits them into two taxpayers for
computational purposes even though they remain jointly liable for the tax. Joint assessment renders
spouses jointly and severally liable for the combined tax debt. Abgabeordnung (Tax Code) § 44 ¶ 1
(Version of October 10, 2002, most recently amended September 22, 2005) (Neugefasst durch Bek. v.
1.10.2002 I 3866; 2003 I 61 zuletzt geändert durch Art. 4 Abs. 22 G v. 22. 9.2005 I 2809) (available at:
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ao_1977/__44.html). Despite joint assessment, however, either

spouse may request separate assessment on his or her separate income only at any time
before payment in full of the jointly assessed tax liability. Abgabeordnung §268.
96

IRC § 1(f). The rate schedules under IRC § 1 (a) – (d) set the maximum rates for 1992, but the brackets
adjust for the increase in the cost of living, measured by the Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers
that the U.S. Department of Labor publishes.
97
IRC § 1(a) sets forth the 1992 level of $250,000, and the bracket adjustments in 2005 under IRC § 1(f)
will cause the maximum rate to affect married individuals filing jointly on their incomes in excess of
$326,450. Rates available at http://www.irs.gov/formspubs/article/0,,id=133517,00.html. For purposes of
comparison, this Article assumes that the euro and dollar are equal in value. During much of 2002 a dollar
was worth approximate 15% more than the euro and the converse has been true since 2003.
98
Supra note 87.
99
IRC § 1(a) – (d).
100
IRC § 151.
101
IRC § 63(c).
© Copyright 2005 Henry Ordower
Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation - Germany/U.S. Constitutional Principles
Page 10

tax includes a negative income tax feature for low-wage workers in the form of the
earned income credit 102 and Germany does not. 103
In addition, the personal exemption amounts and the standard deduction increase
to reflect positive changes in the cost of living. 104 In upper income ranges, U.S. tax rules
add further progression by phasing out the deduction for personal exemptions 105 and
limiting the availability of various deductions for taxpayers who elect to itemize. 106 The
German concept corresponding to U.S. personal exemptions are the basic exempt
amount 107 and the exempt amounts for dependent children. 108 These exemptions are
available to all taxpayers, including those with the largest incomes. 109
If one assumes middle and upper incomes in Germany and the U.S. are
comparable, middle-income taxpayers in Germany tend to become less distinguishable
from upper income taxpayers, than are their American counterparts, with respect to tax
progression positioning. German middle-income taxpayers have the same basic
exemption as the highest income taxpayers and the same dependency allowances as the
highest income taxpayers with the same number of dependents. Since they reach the
maximum rate of tax at only € 104,304, they tend to pay the same proportional tax as the

102

IRC § 32 provides a refundable credit for taxpayers within a narrow band of wage and self-employment
based income.
103
Lest a reader think the U.S. more generous in it welfare type benefits than Germany, Germany provides
a broad range of direct subsidies to its low income and indigent citizens and lawful residents, including
unemployment supplements, child supplements, social insurance, universal health insurance, government
pension system. See, generally, Claus Offe, The German Welfare State: Principles, Performance, Prospects
in John S. Brady, Beverly Crawford, and Sarah Elise Wiliarty eds., The Postwar Transformation of
Germany : Democracy, Prosperity, and Nationhood 202 (Ann Arbor 1999).
104
IRC §151(d)(4) for personal exemptions and § 63(c)(4) for the standard deduction.
105
IRC §151(d)(4) reduces the personal exemptions by 2% for each $2,500 of income over a threshold
amount. The threshold is $150,000 for married individuals filing joint returns. The EGTRRA, supra note
88, beginning in 2006 phases out the exemption’s phase out subject to the sunset under section 901 of
EGTRRA.
106
IRC §68 diminishes itemized deductions for higher income individuals thereby adding both
progressivity and complexity. In addition, IRC §67 limits certain deductions to their aggregate amount in
excess of two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. The two percent floor grows with income
and forces disallowance of ever greater amounts of those deductions. These features, phase-outs and
deduction limitations, increase the effective rate of tax for taxpayers with specific characteristics. Some of
the features create a tax bubble, that is, an increase in rate at certain income levels followed by a
subsequent decrease in rate as income increases further. See, generally, Gregory G. Geisler and Ernest R.
Larkins, Current Year Tax Laws That Cause Low Visibility Of An Individual's Effective Marginal Tax
Rate, 101 TAX NOTES 627 (2003) and Martin A. Sullivan, The Rich Get Soaked while the Super Rich
Slide, 101 TAX NOTES 581 (2003).
107
EStG § 32a establishes the Grundfreibetrag.
108
EStG § 32 (6) and EStG § 31 assures the non-taxability of a subsistence minimum for all taxpayers
without regard to overall income.
109
Decisions of the German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 82, 60 (May 29, 1990), supra note 29, for
example, preclude the German parliament from reducing or eliminating personal exemptions and the
subsistence minimum exemption that the basic exempt amount embodies. See detailed discussion of these
decisions infra in Part 4A.
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upper income taxpayers.110 The German income tax approaches a two rate system
applicable to all taxpayers, a zero rate on part of the income and 45% on the rest. By
comparison, married U.S. taxpayers filing jointly with $104,000 of taxable income would
have three brackets representing together 140% of their rate before topping out. 111 And
the phase-out of the personal exemptions would further distinguish the middle-income
taxpayer, as there is no phase-out in Germany. 112
Whatever progressivity the income tax introduces into the federal taxes in
Germany and the United States, other features of the overall tax system undercut
progressivity. The Constitutional Court, discussing the wealth tax, stated the principle
that with respect to the individual’s production: “the total tax burden remain … a
division of around half for private and half for public use.” 113 Germany raises
approximately the same amount of tax revenue with its turnover tax as it does with its
income tax. 114 The turnover tax diminishes the progressivity present in the income tax by
placing a larger proportional tax burden on lower income taxpayers than on higher
income taxpayers. Lower income taxpayers lack discretionary income because they tend
to have to expend all their income in order to provide for basic consumption of their
necessities such as food, clothing, transportation and housing. Of those necessities, only

110

Extrapolating from some limited statistics available for 1998, it appears that between 4 and 5% of
German taxpayers would be subject to the highest income tax rate in Germany while less than one-half of
one percent would reach the highest U.S. rate on a euro-dollar equivalence. Verteilung der
Markteinkommen und der Einkommensteuerschuld in Deutschland: Eine Auswertung anhand von
einkommensteuerlichen Veranlagungsdaten, Tabelle 92 (available at http://www.sachverstaendigenratwirtschaft.de/download/ziffer/z822_846j03.pdf).
111
Married taxpayers having combined income exceeding the minimum level for the maximum German
rate of tax of € 104,000 (on a euro-dollar equivalence) represented approximately 8% of U.S. taxpayers
who filed returns in 2002. Brian Balcovic, High Income Tax Returns for 2002, Table 2 (available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02hiinco.pdf). Note that the estimates do not include individuals who do not
file returns. Those with combined incomes exceeding the U.S. entrance to the top rate of $326,450
represent significantly less than 2% of returns filed, as approximately 1.89% of the U.S. returns have
income in excess of $200,000 so that the number with income in excess of $300,000 is significantly
smaller. Id. at 6 and Table A.
112
A phase-out would tax the subsistence minimum for taxpayers subject to the phase-out. Taxing the
subsistence minimum violates the principle established in the Constitutional Court decisions discussed
infra in Part 4A.
113
BVerfGE 93, 121, supra note 28, at 138 translating: “die steuerliche Gesamtbelastung … in der Nähe
einer hälftigen Teilung zwischen privater und öffentlicher Hand …” (referring to the estimated yield from
property for purposes of the wealth tax). Obviously, the split ignores the value added tax and the social
insurance imposts. But see BVerfGE, 2 BvR 2194/99 (January 18, 2006), available at:
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20051011_1bvr123200, rejecting a challenge to
a combined effective rate of Income and Municipal Business (Gewerbesteuer, infra note 430) exceeding
fifty percent as violating this fifty-fifty principle and holding that the 50-50 principle does not establish an
absolute ceiling on permissible taxation.
114
Bundesministerium der Finanzen Referat I A 6, supra note 23, Tabelle 2. And see Statistisches
Bundesamt Deutschland, .Kassenmäßige Steuereinnahmen Deutschland (available at
http://www.destatis.de/indicators/d/lrfin02ad.htm) discloses that the turnover tax in 2003 produced
approximate 21.5% of revenues while the personal income tax produced 35.9%. Adding other
consumption taxes to the turnover tax, the percentage increases to 33.5%.
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the rental expenditure for housing is exempt from the turnover tax. 115 However, even in
the case of rental housing, most tenants are not free from indirect taxes. 116 Tenants
generally bear the burden of their shares of the property owner’s real property tax, 117 as
the property owner passes it along with other expenses through the rental price. 118
Individuals with greater incomes may expend more overall and, therefore, pay more tax
than the low income individual, but they are far less likely to expend all their income than
are lower income individuals. Since money devoted to investment does not attract the
turnover tax, 119 the greater one’s income, the smaller the percentage of that income that
becomes subject to the turnover tax, as the taxpayer devotes an ever smaller percentage
of her income to consumption. A tax burden that decreases as a proportion of income as
income increases is regressive.
Germany’s turnover tax, unlike its income tax, has no exemption amount but
seeks to ameliorate its inherent regressivity through a dual rate system. The general
turnover tax rate is sixteen percent 120 but a seven percent rate applies to many necessities
including, public transportation 121 and foodstuffs, other than those a vendor sells for
consumption on the premises, 122 but not clothing that is taxed at the full rate. The
reduced rate applies without regard to the characteristics of the consumer, low income or
high income. The reduced rate diminishes the tax burden on all taxpayers and may
115

UStG § 4 (12a) exempts rent from the turnover tax except for transient use of property, hotel rooms for
example.
116
In the United States as well.
117
Grundsteuergesetz 1973 (GrStG in the following) § 1 authorizes the communities (municipalities) to
determine the rate of tax so that the rate is not uniform throughout Germany. The community imposes the
tax on the value of the real property, rather than directly on the rent that the owner derives from the real
property, under GrStG § 2. Rent is the fee for services or sales price term for the price a buyer pays for the
use of property. While the base for the property tax is property value rather than price for use, the real
property tax, nevertheless, resembles a consumption tax in that the value of real property used to produce
income is a function of the income, that is, the rent. Germany establishes valuation methodology statutorily
with its valuation law (Bewertungsgesetz, Neugefasst durch Bek. v. 1. 2.1991 I 230, zuletzt geändert durch
Art. 14 G v. 20.12.2001 I 3794, BewG followed by a section number in the following). The general
valuation law confirms this relationship as valuation of residential rental property (BewG §76 (1) 1.) refers
to BewG § 79 that begins with annual income and applies a multiplier. The multiplier relates to the type of
use that produces the rent. BewG § 80 refers to the statutory supplements to fix the multiplier, and the
statutory supplements are a function of the size of the community and the nature and age of the building
construction.
118
A rental pricing model would anticipate that rent is a function of the landlord’s costs, including property
tax and maintenance, in providing the rental property plus profit, a pricing model that does not differ
materially from the pricing of goods. While the landlord may fix the rent by examining the overall market,
presumably the market generalizes the model. But models for pricing rentals abound and use a variety of
formulae. See, for example, Bill Veneris, Setting Rental Rates is a Balancing Act, Rental Management
(2004) (available at http://www.rentalmanagementmag.com/newsart.asp?ARTID=1407); Kenneth T. Rosen
and Lawrence B. Smith, The Price-Adjustment Process for Rental Housing and the Natural Vacancy Rate,
73 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 779 (1983); Joseph L. Pagliari, Jr. and James R. Webb, On Setting
Apartment Rental Rates: A Regression-Based Approach, 12 THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 37
(2001).
119
UStG §4(8) exempts the sale of corporate stocks and bonds.
120
UStG §12 (1)
121
UStG §12 (2) 10.
122
UStG §12 (2) 1. and Anlage (supplement).
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introduce limited progressivity in the middle income range, as middle income taxpayers
may spend a very large percentage of their income on consumption weighted toward the
higher rate items. In addition, the amount of the subsistence minimum that remains
exempt from income tax for all taxpayers presumably includes the various indirect taxes
that individuals must pay. 123 Under the German definition of income that generally
excludes capital gains, 124 regressivity would arise only with respect to high-income
taxpayers who invest rather than consuming their income and then only vis à vis other
middle or upper income taxpayers who consume a greater percentage of their respective
incomes. 125
In the U.S., consumption taxes at state level inject regressivity into the combined
federal and state tax system. 126 Like the German turnover tax, some of the state sales
taxes use dual or multiple rate structures to ameliorate the regressivity of the sales tax127
or burden limited types of expenditures more heavily. 128 Most states tax sales of goods
but not performance of services under their consumption tax, leaving the taxation of
services to the income tax while sales of goods are subject to both income and sales
taxes. Low income individuals tend to consume proportionally fewer services that do
high income individuals, so that this characteristic of the sales tax system adds additional
regressivity overall. The Supreme Court has not held regressive taxation to be
unconstitutional even though it determined that a graduated state tax on retail sales
violated the equal protection clause because gross sales was not a measure of profitability
to which a graduated rate tax might apply. 129

123

Exemption of the subsistence minimum occurs through various exemptions, EStG §32, for example
(describing various exemptions [Freibeträge], and the zero rate bracket [Grundfreibetrag], EStG §32a).
The constitutional court identifies a relationship between indirect taxes and the amount of the subsistence
minimum that defines the exempt amounts. BVerfGE 87, 153 at 156 (September 25, 1992, II Senat),
discussed infra in text commencing with note 381. This Article discusses the dichotomy between
mandatory and discretionary expenditures and the exemption of the mandatory expenditures (subsistence
minimum) from the income tax infra in Part 4A.
124
Unlike the U.S., Germany does not tax capital appreciation. Supra note 93. If, in order to generate a
consistent measure of regressivity across taxing systems, one views capital appreciation or even only
realized gains from the disposition of capital investments as income that draws a zero rate of tax, the
presence of regressivity in the German system is likely to emerge relative to low income taxpayers as well
as middle income taxpayers.
125
See Appendix for this analysis.
126
See notes 72 - 79 supra and accompanying text for discussion of those consumption taxes.
127
For example, Illinois and Missouri reduce the rate for food. ALL STATES TAX HANDBOOK, supra note
73, at ¶250.
128
Passenger car rentals in New York, liquor in Arkansas, for examples. Id.
129
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, reh. denied, 295 U.S. 768 (1935) (Kentucky’s graduated
rate tax on gross retail sales violated equal protection because not rationally related with any certainty to
ability to pay). See discussion infra in Part 3B.
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At federal level, moreover, the social security, 130 self-employment 131 and
Medicare taxes 132 introduce considerable regressivity into the tax laws because they tax
income from wages 133 and self-employment,134 but not investment, 135 and because the
social security and self-employment taxes do not even reach all employment and selfemployment income. 136 Employed, low income individuals pay social security tax even
when they are exempt from federal income tax.137 Congress designed the earned income
credit, 138 in part, to compensate for the social security tax low wage earners would have
to pay. 139 Through lower wages, employees tend to bear the burden of both their own
and the employer’s share of the social security tax. 140
Germany likewise has a series of wage and self-employment income based taxes
to finance social insurance programs, 141 including a national pension program, 142
unemployment insurance, 143 universal health care insurance 144 and long-term care
insurance. 145 Employer and employee make equal contributions with respect to the
employee’s salary. While the governing statutes call the payments contributions to
130

IRC §§3101(a), 3111(a) [employee, employer respectively social security tax for old-age, survivors, and
disability insurance]. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra note 17, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (determining
that the social security tax neither violates the uniformity clause, despite limitations on its applicability to
specific industries and numbers of employees, nor reservation of powers to the states clause of U.S.
Constitution Amend. 10 and is constitutional). Some argue that the social security tax, for example, is not
a tax, even though it is an involuntary imposition. See Thuronyi, supra note 39, at 45 for discussion of
what constitutes a tax.
131
IRC § 1401(a) [tax on self-employment income for old-age, survivors, and disability insurance
132
IRC § 1401(b) [hospital tax on self-employment income], §§3101(b), 3111(b) [employee, employer
respectively hospital tax].
133
IRC §§3101(a), 3121(a) (defining wages).
134
IRC §§1401(a), 1402(a) (defining self-employment income).
135
IRC § 86 taxes as much as half the social security benefits that certain middle and higher income
individuals receive and thereby adds a little progressivity in connection with social security benefits.
136
IRC §1402(b) defines self-employment income as limited by the Social Security Act section 230
contribution and benefit base so as to form the ceiling. The base does increase for inflation. Similarly, IRC
§3121 limits wages for purposes of IRC §§3101(a) and 3111(a) in the same manner.
137
William G. Gale and Jeffrey Rohaly, Three-Quarters Of Filers Pay More In Payroll Taxes Than In
Income Taxes, 98 Tax Notes 119 (January 6, 2003).
138
Supra note 102 and accompanying text.
139
HR 2166, HR Report 94-19 at 10 (94th Cong. 1st Sess, Feb. 25, 1975) and more directly, S.Rep. 94-36
(94th Cong. 1st Sess, March 17, 1975) at 11 that reads in part: “[t]he credit is set at 10 percent in order to
correspond roughly to the added burdens placed on workers by both the employee and employer social
security contributions.”
140
Id. The Senate report certainly suggests that Senate taxwriters believed that the employee bore the
burden of both the employer’s and the employee’s share of social security taxes.
141
For general information on German social insurance programs, see Willem Adema, Donald Gray and
Sigrun Kahl, Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers – No. 58 – Social Assistance in
Germany, OECD Document JT00137448 (2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/60/34004521.pdf.
142
With a contribution rate of 9.55% (19.1% total) on gross earnings up to €54,000. Germany 2002 – Taxbenefit country chapter – Benefits and Wages §10.2 (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/43/2491133.pdf
143
With a contribution rate of 3.25% (6.5% total) on gross earnings up to €54,000. Id.
144
With a contribution rate of 7.00% (14% total) on gross earnings up to €40,500. Id.
145
With a contribution rate of 0.85% (1.7% total) on gross earnings up to €40,500. Id.
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insurance or pension plans, the imposts are mandatory not elective. So the payments are
the equivalent of taxes as are the social security and Medicare taxes in the United
States. 146 Also, like the United States, the tax base in each instance relates to services
income but not investment income, so that the series of insurance payments tends toward
the regressive. Germany’s social insurance contributions distinguish themselves from
United States contributions in that they have very moderate wage and self-employment
income caps. 147
Both the German and the U.S. tax systems rely heavily on an income tax to raise
governmental revenues. Within the income taxes, both systems appear to adopt the
concept of vertical equity through progressive taxation. Yet, neither the German nor the
U.S. tax system consistently adheres to progressivity as fundamental to tax structure.
Rather both systems permit considerable regressivity in the combined impact of assorted
taxes, the U.S. with its social security and self-employment taxes and Germany with its
turnover tax. With that observation by way of background, notions of fairness that may
underlie either or both systems must remain on the horizontal plane – tax fairness, and
courts’ intervention to assure fairness remains a matter of treating like taxpayers alike.
Part 3 The United States – Constitutional Arguments Generally Fail as to Federal
Statutes but not State Statutes.
Although taxpayers have challenged federal tax classifications on equal protection
grounds, 148 the database for a recent empirical study of U.S. Supreme Court decisionmaking in tax cases 149 discloses no case in which taxpayers were successful. 150 On the
other hand, the Supreme Court was receptive to a due process challenge to retroactive
application of the estate tax 151 and the gift tax 152 as applied to transfers at death or by gift
before enactment of the tax. More recently, however, retroactivity arguments challenging
the minimum tax 153 and a technical correction have failed. 154 Hence, unlike the German
146

See supra note 130.
Supra note 136 and accompanying text.
148
E.g. Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (unsuccessfully arguing that
exclusion from I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) classification for lobbying denied equal protection vis á vis veterans
organizations) discussed infra in text accompanying note 213.
149
Nancy Staudt and Peter Wiedenbeck’s Supreme Court Tax Database (soon to be published on
http://law.wustl.edu), supra note 9. The database identified 157 decisions in which the Supreme Court
resolved a case involving federal tax law on constitutional grounds.
150
Id. There are, however, cases involving state taxation that the Court decided on equal protection
grounds: Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989),
(prohibiting non-uniform assessment of tax on real property); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (prohibiting taxing real estate of camp for non-residents of state while
exempting real estate of camps for residents). supra note 20 discussed infra Part 3B.
151
Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (on foreseeability grounds).
152
Untermyer v Anderson, 276 US 440 (1928).
153
Darusmont v. United States, 449 US 292 (1981) (holding that retroactive imposition within a taxable
year of the minimum tax on tax preference items constitutional). See, generally, Charles B. Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692 (1960), and,
147
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constitutional court, the U.S. Supreme Court has proven unsympathetic to applying equal
protection analysis to the distributive effects of taxing statutes and has retreated from
earlier application of due process analysis to retroactive application of tax law changes.
Most constitutional federal tax jurisprudence involving no criminal question
developed in the early decades of the post Sixteenth Amendment years. More than twothirds of the federal law, constitutional decisions date to 1940 or earlier. 155 Of the post1940 decisions, fully one-third involve criminal matters while none of the 1940 or
previous decisions resolves a criminal issue. 156 Moreover, on federal questions,
decisions predominantly have supported the government’s power to tax. Taxpayers have
won in the Supreme Court with constitutional arguments in only slightly more than ten
percent of the cases that reached the Supreme Court (including the criminal cases). 157
And the Supreme Court in more recent year has overruled or limited its early decisions
that were favorable to the taxpayer. 158 For example, the Court in 1988 firmly established
the federal government’s power to tax interest that states pay on their indebtedness 159 and
Congress’ power to limit the statutory exemption for interest on state obligations.160
Taxpayers have enjoyed greater success in asserting limitations on a state’s power to tax
residents and non-residents differently 161 and transactions involving interstate
commerce. 162
A.
Miscellaneous Taxpayer Successes. The U.S. Constitution requires that Congress
apportion direct taxes among the states. 163 The Supreme Court resolved some of the
uncertainty concerning the meaning of a direct tax as it rejected an early income tax
insofar as it taxed income from real property. 164 The Court held that a tax on real
more recently, Brian E. Raftery, Comment: Taxpayers Of America Unite! You Have Everything To Lose A Constitutional Analysis Of Retroactive Taxation, 6 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 803 (1996).
154
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (U.S., 1994) (holding that retroactive application of a technical
correction to a tax statute denying taxpayer a deduction does not violate due process).
155
Staudt and Wiedenbeck’s Supreme Court Tax Database, supra note 9.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001) (overruling Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) with
respect to operation of the Compensation Clause. See discussion infra in text accompanying note 182
159
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 US 505 (1988), reh. den. 486 US 1062, discussed infra in text
accompanying note 288.
160
I.R.C. §103. Interest on local government obligations is also exempt from federal income taxation under
I.R.C. §103 as local governmental units derive their authority and are federal law considers them to be part
of the state from which they derive their authority. Jewell Cass Phillips, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA 36 (New York 1960).
161
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (prohibiting taxing real estate of
camp for non-residents of state while exempting real estate of camps for residents). supra note 20;
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). (rejecting Alabama’s tax preference
for in-state insurers, discussed infra Section 3C.
162
National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (limiting the state’s power to
impose collection responsibility for use taxes on non-resident vendors with no substantial presence in the
state), supra note 21, discussed in Section 3D infra.
163
Art. I, Sec. 2 [3] provides in part: “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States … according to their respective Numbers ….”
164
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895).
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property certainly was a direct tax and concluded that a tax on the income from real
property was the same as a tax on the property itself. Therefore it was a direct tax
requiring apportionment. 165 On rehearing, the Court extended its holding to income
from personal property.166 Taxing that income also was a direct tax that, absent
apportionment by population, the Constitution prohibited.167 However, enactment of the
16th Amendment in 1913 removed the apportionment barrier to the income tax. 168
In an early post-16th Amendment decision, the definition of income confronted
the Supreme Court. In Eisner v. Macomber, 169 a taxpayer successfully challenged
imposition of an income tax on corporate dividends payable in the corporation’s own
shares – so-called “stock dividends.” Congress expressly included stock dividends in the
tax base for the income tax, but the Court held that the 16th Amendment did not empower
Congress to tax appreciation in the value of the taxpayer’s property before the taxpayer’s
relationship to the property changed. 170 It is the change in the taxpayer’s relationship to
165

Id. at 583.
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (rehearing), 158 US 601 622 (1895).
167
Id. at 622.
168
The 16th Amendment reads: “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.”
Recently, the subject of direct taxes and apportionment has reemerged and led to renewed debate
among tax commentators with respect to proposals in Congress and among tax commentators advocating
national sales taxes or other consumption taxes. One commentator has argued that a consumption tax or
value added tax might violate the apportionment requirement and is not covered by the 16th Amendment.
Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the 16th Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 Ariz. St. L. J.
1057 (2001). Another disagrees and insists that the direct tax/apportionment restriction had to do with
slavery and has no continuing significance. Calvin H. Johnson, Purging out Pollock: The Constitutionality
of Federal Wealth or Sales Taxes, Tax Notes 1723 (December 30, 2002). Their debate continued in further
in TAX NOTES in 2003. Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Taxation, Tax Notes 821 (August 11,
2003) and Calvin H. Johnson, Barbie Dolls in the Archeological Dig: Professor Johnson Responds, Tax
Notes 832 (August 11, 2003). More recent additions to this discussion include Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting
the Sixteenth Amendment (by Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 Const. Comm. 355 (2004), Erik M.
Jensen, The Taxing Power: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Westport, 2005),
Calvin Johnson, RIGHTEOUS ANGER OF THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION (Cambridge, 2005). Leo P. Martinez, The trouble with taxes: fairness, tax policy, and the
Constitution. 31 Hastings Const. L.Q. 413-446 (2004).
Unclear from the language quoted in note 163 supra is whether a value added tax model of the
consumption tax might be an indirect tax and not subject to apportionment at all, despite general
acknowledgement that the burden of the tax fall upon the ultimate consumer of the goods or services that
are subject to the tax, so long as its rate is uniform throughout the United States. Art. I, Sec. 8 [1] of the
U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the power to tax “but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States; ….” Other consumption tax models tax income but defer the imposition of
any tax when the taxpayer invests, rather than consumes, the income. See discussion of the distinction
between direct and indirect taxes supra note 50.
169
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189 (1920). For an extensive discussion of Macomber and the
Constitution, see Henry M. Ordower, Revisiting Realization -- Accretion Taxation, the Constitution,
Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 Virginia Tax Review 1 (1993).
170
In Macomber, id., a corporation distributed a stock dividend to all common shareholders of record in the
corporation, so that each shareholder’s voting and participation rights remained unchanged despite the
stock dividend. The shareholders received no cash or other property. The Court viewed taxing the
distribution as taxing unrealized appreciation in the value of the shares.
166
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the property that generates the taxable event. When the taxpayer sells or exchanges the
appreciated property, the taxpayer’s relationship to the property changes and a taxable
event occurs. Similarly, when, in the case of a stock dividend as in Macomber, 171 the
taxpayers’ rights relative to the rights of other shareholders change or may change, a
taxable event occurs.172 Since the Supreme Court resolved the question in the taxpayer’s
favor in Macomber on constitutional grounds, Congress nevertheless has taken several
steps toward taxing unrealized appreciation in mark to market rules applicable to
commodities contracts 173 and inventoried securities. 174 Taxpayers have not challenged
those statutes with the effort required to reach the Supreme Court and many
commentators conclude that Macomber is no barrier to taxing unrealized appreciation. 175
While taxpayers consistently have lost federal tax cases in which they raised Bill
of Rights claims, 176 taxpayers in recent years have met somewhat greater success with
other constitutional claims. For example, the Supreme Court held that the Compensation
Clause of the Constitution 177 is no barrier to imposition of a non-discriminatory tax on
federal employees and other citizens, including judges, because there is no risk that
Congress might impose the tax to influence judicial decisions. 178 In so holding, the Court
overruled its earlier Compensation Clause decision that broadly prohibited imposing a
new tax on judges’ salaries. 179 The decision gave taxpayers a partial victory by
permitting extension of the Medicare tax, 180 but not the Social Security tax, 181 to sitting
federal judges. The court distinguished the Medicare tax from the Social Security tax
because the Social Security tax was discriminatory. Most other federal employees could
elect whether or not to participate in social security, but judges and a limited group of
high-level federal employees were required to participate in Social Security.182
Similarly, taxpayers successfully argued that the ad valorem Harbor Maintenance Tax 183
that the U.S. imposed on export shipments was indeed a tax 184 that the Export Clause
171

Id.
Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (holding a dividend of common stock on preferred to be
taxable); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937), reh’g. denied, 302 U.S. 781 (1938) (holding a
distribution of preferred shares on common where preferred shares were already outstanding to be taxable).
173
IRC §1256.
174
IRC §475
175
See Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the
Recent Decisions, 35 Ill. L. Rev. NW. U. 779 (1941); more recently, Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive
Account of the Realization Rule, 57 Tax L. Rev. 355 (2004) (arguing that a realization based tax system
makes sense but rejecting any constitutional realization requirement; but missing absence of evidence of
change in the Supreme Court’s view of the issue since Macomber). And to the contrary, Ordower,
Revisiting Realization, supra note 169.
176
Infra discussion in section 3B.
177
The Compensation Clause guarantees federal judges a "Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office," U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1.
178
United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (U.S., 2001).
179
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
180
I.R.C. §3101(b)(4)-(6).
181
I.R.C. §3101(a).
182
United States v. Hatter, supra note 178, 532 U.S. at 576.
183
I.R.C. §4461.
184
United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
172
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prohibited 185 rather than user fees. Likewise a nondiscriminatory federal excise tax on
insurance premiums 186 violated the export clause insofar as it reached insurance
premiums paid on export shipments. 187
B.
Bill of Rights Decisions – Federal Law Challenges. Taxpayers enjoyed early
victories with Due Process Clause arguments against retroactive application of the gift
and estate taxes to gifts the taxpayer completed before enactment of the tax. 188 Those
victories seem a function of lack of warning to taxpayers, rather than a reflection of a
fundamental limitation on retroactive tax changes. Hence, the Court distinguished a
change in the estate tax base that included gifts in contemplation of death 189 from the
unanticipated, new tax, due process precedents. 190 The Court observed that retroactive
application of the change worked no injustice. Gifts in contemplation of death were
equivalent to transfers at death. The taxpayer reasonably could have anticipated the risk
that Congress would change the law to include gifts in contemplation of death, as many
states already included such gifts in their inheritance tax base. 191 Compare the Supreme
Court’s early decision permitting the first, post-16th Amendment income tax statute to
reach income the taxpayer realized during the taxable year before enactment of the statute
but after adoption of the amendment to the Constitution.192 More recent decisions have
given the United States still greater authority to impose tax law changes retroactively.
For example, reduction of the decedent’s unified estate and gift tax credit193 for gift tax
exemptions the taxpayer claimed under prior law was permissible 194 even though the tax
185

The Export Clause states: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
186
I.R.C. §4371.
187
United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
188
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927); Untermyer v Anderson, 276 US 440 (1928), supra note 152
(holding the imposition of the gift tax on gifts completed in the year of enactment of the gift tax but before
introduction and enactment of the gift tax legislation to be impermissible retroactive taxation). Similarly,
Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (imposing estate tax on gifts completed before enactment but
structured that they would come within the statutory inclusion of gifts intended to take effect on death
impermissible as retroactive taxation).
189
Congress has since substituted an objective three year of death rule for the subjective concept of a gift in
contemplation of death. I.R.C. §2035, as amended by P.L. 94-455, Sec. 2001(a)(5) (2d Sess. 1976).
Compare, however, Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) (rejecting a 6 year of death presumption
of contemplation of death), Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (rejecting a 2 year of death
presumption of contemplation of death). The current federal statute makes no presumption of
contemplation of death. Rather it simply includes gifts made within 3 years of death in the decedent’s
gross estate.
190
Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
191
Id. at 22. And similarly with inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the decedent’s estate when the
decedent paid premiums. United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960). But not where
the right to proceeds of policies vested in the beneficiaries before enactment of the estate tax. Lewellyn v.
Frick, 268 U.S. 238 (1925)
192
Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR, 240 US 1, 24 (1916) (permitting the first income tax act to tax incomes
retroactively to the date earlier the same year that the 16th Amendment took effect) and Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U.S. 142, supra note 188 (prohibiting retroactive application of the gift tax to a period before the
Congress began to consider the tax) support this approach.
193
I.R.C. §2010.
194
United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 571 (1986).
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benefit of the claimed exemption disappeared as the gift became part of the decedent’s
estate under the three year of death rule. 195 In so holding, the Court expressly limited its
earlier decisions to those instances in which the taxpayer had no notice of the change or
contemplated change in the law before electing a course of action or Congress enacted a
new tax. 196 And in upholding a retroactive extension of a state income tax to dividends
that previously had been exempt, the Court observed in alluding to the planning issue
with a retroactive gift tax “[w]e can not assume that stockholders would refuse to receive
corporate dividends even if they knew that their receipt would later be subjected to a new
tax …” 197
Congress generally seeks to avoid the potential retroactivity problem by
announcing publicly proposed tax changes and making them effective no earlier that the
date of that announcement. However, where a taxpayer planned a transaction to exploit a
flaw in a statute, neither the taxpayer’s planning nor the absence of a public
announcement in advance of the effective date of the change was a barrier to retroactive
application of the statute as changed. 198 The statute in question and in effect at the
decedent’s death allowed a deduction for one-half the value of employer securities that an
estate sold to an employee stock option plan. 199 The estate purchased shares on the
market, sold them to an employee stock option plan and claimed the deduction –
correctly applying the statutory provision as then in effect. The retroactive statutory
change limited the statute to sales of shares that were includible in the decedent’s estate,
so the estate received no deduction. The Court viewed the change as a rational limitation
of the statute to those instances that Congress originally contemplated reaching with the
benefit targeting transition of ownership from decedents to employees of the business in
which the decedent was involved before death. Retroactive application was modest and
the change was not arbitrary. 200
Taxpayers have fared no better in the Supreme Court with First Amendment
based, religious freedom tax claims than they have with due process claims. With respect
to the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,201 for example, the Supreme
Court refused to exempt Amish taxpayers from the social security tax even though the
Court acknowledged that their religious beliefs precluded the Amish from participating in
any governmental social welfare system. 202 Free exercise of their religion had to yield to
the need for uniform, non-discriminatory taxation to provide a fiscally sound social
195

I.R.C. §2035 includes completed gifts that the decedent made within three years of death in the
decedent’s estate.
196
United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. at 567-8 (distinguishing Blodgett v. Holden, supra note 188, 275
U.S. 142, on the basis of surprise and limiting Untermyer v Anderson, supra note 188, 276 US 440 to
enactment of wholly new taxes).
197
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 148 (1938).
198
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
199
I.R.C. §2057 (repealed).
200
United States v. Carlton, supra note 198, 512 U.S. at 32.
201
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; ….” U.S. Constitution Amendment I.
202
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
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security system. 203 The Court similarly determined that religious organizations
advancing racial segregation principles operated contrary to public policy 204 and
accordingly were not entitled to tax exempt status. 205 The Court held that the
fundamental policy against racial discrimination means that “[r]acially discriminatory
educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit within the
‘charitable’ concept …” that tax exempt status requires. 206
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed directly the issue of whether the
subsidy provided to churches through the federal income tax deduction violates the
principle of church-state separation under the First Amendment, 207 it permitted New
York’s exemption of churches from property taxes to stand despite the state subsidy
inherent in the exemption. 208 On balance, absence of an exemption might lead to greater
state entanglement because “[e]limination of exemption would tend to expand the
involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens,
tax foreclosures…” 209 And the Court has acknowledged that there is a subsidy in the
charitable contribution deduction, but it is neutral with respect to the issue of religious
establishment as it provides deduction for gifts to all religious as well as many secular
entities. 210 Denial of the deduction for fixed fees for Scientology auditing, even if a
fundamental religious practice, nevertheless was correct because the donor received a
quid pro quo that is inconsistent with a charitable gift and similar to religious school
tuition for which taxpayers receive no deduction. 211
Freedom of speech claims 212 that a public interest, lobbying organization
advanced in favor of its right to receive tax deductible contributions also failed to
persuade the Supreme Court. 213 The taxpayer enjoyed tax exempt status 214 but its
lobbying activities precluded it from securing that type of tax exempt status that would
allow its donors a deduction for contributions to the organization. 215 The Court also
rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the statute denied the organization equal protection

203

Id. at 259-60.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
205
I.R.C. §501(c)(3). Contributions to organizations that do not have tax exempt status under I.R.C.
§501(c)(3) are not deductible by the donor.
206
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, supra note 204, 461 U.S. at 595.
207
I.R.C. §170 allows a federal income tax deduction for gifts to charities, including churches.
208
Walz v. Tax Com. of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674-5 (1970).
209
Id.
210
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 694 (U.S., 1989).
211
Id. at 693.
212
“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech …” U.S. Constitution Amendment I.
213
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, supra note 148, 461 U.S. at 545 (1983)
214
I.R.C. §501(c)(4) exempts not-for-profit organizations that promote social welfare, among other
activities, from the federal income tax.
215
Generally, I.R.C. §170(c)(2) limits the charitable contribution deduction to organizations that are public
charities and exempt under I.R.C. §501(c)(3). I.R.C. §501(c)(3) status is unavailable to any organization
that devotes a substantial part of its activities to lobbying.
204
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of the law 216 relative to veterans’ organizations that could receive deductible
contributions even though they engaged in lobbying. 217 The Court deferred to Congress’
authority to discriminate among organizations to give a benefit so long as its basis for
dissimilar treatment was rational. 218 The Court observed that Congress may have chosen
veterans’ organizations for additional tax benefits by making contributions to them
deductible by the donor, despite the organizations’ lobbying, because of their members’
historical service to the country.219
C. Bill of Rights Cases (Due Process and Equal Protection) – State Law Challenges. The
early twentieth century saw many challenges to state taxes that included or relied on
claims that the state tax violated due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Those due process and equal protection arguments met greater success
when advanced against state taxing statutes than they did against federal statutes although
the Supreme Court deferred generally to the state legislatures’ choices with respect to
their tax objects and structures. Using its least intrusive standard of review, the “rational
basis test,” 220 the Supreme Court struck down state taxing schemes only when the
justices thought the classifications of taxpayers and tax objects to be arbitrary. The state
could classify taxpayers and treat them differently from one another as long as it had a
reasonable purpose for doing so.
While the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the socalled “marriage penalty” 221 under the federal income tax, 222 in Hoeper v. Tax
216

U.S. Const. Amendment 14 reads in part: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”
217
I.R.C. §170(c)(3) allows a charitable contribution deduction for gifts to veterans’ organizations, exempt
under I.R.C. §501(c)(19), notwithstanding their lobbying activities.
218
Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540, supra note 148, at 550. The type of
distinction does not require “strict scrutiny,” that is, a more stringent review than “rational basis” that
requires a compelling state interest in the classification.
219
Id. at 550-1.
220
On standard of review distinguishing the rational basis test from strict scrutiny that the Court applies to
suspect classifications, see, generally, Lockhart et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 36, Ch. 10.
221
Marriage penalty customarily refers to the additional tax that a married couple pays than two single
individuals with the same combined income. Thus, in a single income married household, joint filing
permits income splitting and a lower tax than the comparable tax payable by an unmarried individual with
the same income, but in a dual income married household, the combined income often causes the tax
payable to be greater than the combined tax that two single individuals would pay. Compare IRC §1(a)
(joint filing) with IRC §1(c) (unmarried, single filing). The rate bracket size for married individuals filing
joint returns is less than twice the rate bracket size applicable to single individuals. IRC §1(f)(8) phases out
the marriage penalty for the 15% marginal bracket only. The statute returns to its pre-2003 formulation,
thereby restoring the marriage penalty at all brackets under the general sunset provision, section 901, of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, P.L. 107-16 (1st Sess. 2001). Separate filing
does not make the tax the same, as a separate rate bracket schedule applies to married individuals filing
separate returns. The brackets for that schedule are exactly one-half the married filing jointly brackets and
preserves the marriage penalty. IRC § 1(d).
222
The Court denied certiorari in one instance. Johnson v. United States, 422 F.Supp. 958 (N.Ill. 1976),
aff’d.per curium sub. nom Barter v. U.S., 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 US 1012 (1978).
One may not assume that the denial of a petition for certiorari discloses anything concerning the Supreme
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Commission of Wisconsin, 223 the Supreme Court determined that a Wisconsin joint
income taxation statute violated the due process clause. The statute in Hoeper required
married couples to aggregate their incomes and pay tax according to a single rate
schedule applicable to both single and married taxpayers. Graduated surtaxes caused the
amount of tax payable to be greater than it would have been had each spouse’s income
been separate from the other spouse for tax purposes. The court viewed the aggregation
as causing one taxpayer to become subject to tax on another person’s income in violation
of due process, as state law gave neither spouse an interest in the other’s income as
community property law would. 224
With three justices dissenting, the Supreme Court expressly upheld sex-based tax
discrimination at state level against an equal protection argument in Kahn v. Shevin. 225
There a widower unsuccessfully challenged Florida’s property tax exemption for widows,
but not widowers. The Court found that the disparity between women’s and men’s
incomes provided a rational basis for the state distinguishing and providing a
Court’s view as to the substance of the case. Compare the German Constitutional Court’s prohibition of
mandatory joint assessment in BVerfGE 6, 55 (January 17, 1957), discussed infra in text accompanying
and following note 415.
223
284 U.S. 206 (1931).
224
Id. at 215. Against the backdrop of Hoeper, the district court in Johnson v. United States, 422 F.Supp.
958, supra note 222 carefully analyzed the federal marriage penalty against due process and equal
protection arguments and concluded that the federal statute did not violate the Constitution. The court
distinguished the statute in Hoeper from the federal statute that did not require married taxpayers to
aggregate their incomes. Id.. at 967-8. The leading Supreme Court precedents on the issue of the right to
marry and privacy within marriage, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut; 381 US 479 (1965) (holding that
the state may not restrict the freedom of the marital unit to use birth control devices), Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a statute that prohibited marriage between individuals of different races;
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (including the right to divorce within the fundamental right to
marriage and limiting the application of a filing fee to indigent plaintiffs), led the court to conclude that
marriage was a fundamental right, so the court had to apply strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause
to the taxing statute as a burden on that right. Id.. at 969-71. The court noted, however, that the courts give
particular deference to legislatures’ design of taxing statutes and noted further that the joint bracket
schedule benefits some marriages while burdening others. Id.. at 971-2. And see note 221 supra on the
marriage penalty. Pointing out that statistical evidence demonstrates that most unmarried taxpayers do not
live alone, the court handily rejected the government’s argument that married taxpayers enjoy economies
from maintaining a single household and can afford, therefore, to pay a higher tax. Id. at 972.
Nevertheless, the district court upheld the statute. Finding that the history of taxation provided the
compelling interest necessary to support the burden on some married couples. The first income-splitting
statutes permitted married individuals to pay a tax of twice the tax imposed at single rates on one-half the
marital unit’s combined income, thereby doubling the bracket size for the marital unit. (Germany continues
to employ that true income splitting scheme with double rate brackets under its income tax. EStG §32a
(5).) As a result of that structure, unmarried individuals reached the next bracket at twice the rate as
married individuals with identical income in single income marriages. In order to diminish the disparity in
income tax burden between single taxpayers and comparable single income marital units, Congress
established the married filing jointly rate schedule. Further, Congress sought to treat all marital units the
same whether single or dual income units by adopting the married filing separately schedule. The
government’s objective to achieve those two goals provided a sufficiently compelling government interest
to support the marriage penalty. Johnson at 973. Taxpayers’ appeal of the district court’s decision proved
fruitless. Aff’d.per curium sub. nom Barter v. U.S., 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 US
1012 (1978).
225
416 U.S. 351 (1974) .
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discriminatory benefit for the class of widows in order to reduce ‘the disparity between
the economic capabilities of a man and a woman.’ 226 In an earlier decision, 227 the Court
similarly upheld that a Georgia poll tax 228 exemption for women, who do not vote,
against equal protection challenge. The Court viewed the poll tax exemption as rationally
related to statutory economic responsibilities because under Georgia law men were
financially responsible for the family and thus would bear both the wife’s and children’s
poll tax burden. 229 The appellant did not raise, nor did the Court address on its own, the
issue of whether the tax exemption might discourage women from exercising their
recently acquired franchise in order to avoid the tax.230 The Court did emphasize that, in
the case, the poll tax was not a disguise in order to deny men the right to vote by making
payment of the tax a condition to voting registration. 231
Despite taxpayers’ failures to persuade the Supreme Court to invalidate statutes in
several sex discrimination cases, there is a line of Supreme Court decisions prohibiting
states from discriminating among classes of taxpayers. The bulk of taxpayer successes in
those cases involves classifications that discriminate against non-resident taxpayers. Yet,
there are several cases, like Hoeper, 232 for which residence is not a factor. 233 For
example, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission Of Webster County,
West Virginia, 234 the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause requires that
the county assess property for tax purposes substantially uniformly. While no state
statute specifically authorized the assessor to assess recently purchased properties at their
arms’ length sale price but not increase assessments to reflect current market values of
other properties, the assessor adopted that practice. Hence taxes remained stable for
properties that did not change ownership and increased for properties that changed
ownership. This practice created a large disparity in relative tax burden of similar
properties in violation of equal protection. 235 Later, when similar assessment disparities
arose from Proposition 13 in California, 236 the Court upheld the tax. 237 The Court
226

Id. at 352.
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
228
A poll tax is a capitation tax. Westin, supra note 81, at 529.
229
Breedlove, supra note 227, 302 U.S. at 282. The decision precedes most of the racial discrimination
cases and includes language that later decisions would eschew: “[i]n view of burdens necessarily borne by
them (men) for the preservation of the race, …. Id. The term “race” in the decision is probably racially
neutral as referring to human race, although the appellant is: “a white male citizen 28 years old.” Id. at
279.
230
U.S. Const. Amendment 19, enacted in 1920, guarantees the right to vote without regard to sex.
231
Breedlove, supra note 227, 302 U.S. at 284.
232
Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206, supra note 223.
233
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) (holding, but on statutory, not equal
protection grounds, that a state may not tax retired federal employees’ pensions while exemption retired
state employees’ pensions).
234
488 U.S. 336 (1989). Compare the German Constitutional Court ruling the wealth tax unconstitutional
because the valuation of real property failed to adjust for current market values, BVerfGE 93, 121, supra
note 28, discussed infra in Part 4E.
235
Id. at 342-3.
236
Proposition 13 was a voter initiative that added Article XIIIA to the California constitution in 1978.
Article XIIIA limits ad valorem taxes to one percent of the cash value of the real property as fixed in the
1975-6 assessment, subject to annual increase no greater than 2% per year. Following a non-exempt
227
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distinguished Allegheny determining that the Proposition 13 limitation that created the
disparity had the rational purposes 238 of preserving neighborhood stability and protecting
existing owners from rapid increase in taxes. A new owner did not require that protection
because the new owner could decide not to buy in light of the expected increase in tax. 239
Exclusions of specific types of workers and employers with fewer than eight
employees from the Social Security tax and accompanying state unemployment taxes did
not violate the equal protection clause because the exemptions bore a rational relationship
to the purpose of the act.240 On the other hand, the Court rejected a distinction in a
recording tax based upon the length of the mortgage and held the distinction between five
years or more and less than five years to be arbitrary. 241 Yet, the Court accepted the
statute’s exemption, even for mortgages longer than five years, if the lender was a
building and loan association. 242 Similarly, a business tax imposed on the gross receipts
of a corporation but not on the gross receipts of an individual engaged in the same
business was not acceptable under the equal protection clause since it was arbitrarily
discriminatory. 243 And, likewise, disparity in voting rights on tax matters as function of
property ownership did violate equal protection. 244
The Court has never held that equal protection requires vertical equity, 245 so that
equal protection neither demands progressivity nor prohibits regressivity in taxation. 246
Both the federal government and the states have great flexibility in determining their
rates and tax bases. A progressive rate structure received express approval from the
Court. 247 And, without addressing the regressive impact of its rate structure, the Court

transfer such as a gift from parent to child, reassessment to current cash value is permissible. Article XIIIA
also requires a vote of the people to approve any statutory tax increase in any California tax.
237
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
238
The Court rejected any higher level of scrutiny than rational basis to support the constitutional provision
and implementing statutes. Id. at 11.
239
Id. The Court did not offer this latter rational in Allegheny. Note that the property tax increase on sale
should adversely affect the sale price, as the buyer will have to pay a comparatively high tax. Moreover,
the limit on assessment increases locks existing owners into their property, as moving within California is
likely to cause them to pay materially higher real estate taxes.
240
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513 (1937) (, for example, exempting
agricultural workers may be rational because of the administrative difficulties of collection).
241
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 38 (1928).
242
Id. at 40 (holding that the building and loan exemption serves the public purpose of encouraging home
ownership).
243
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 402 (1928).
244
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (rejecting the Texas dual box system that required approval of bond
issues and taxes by two classes of voters, one class consisting of owners of property subject to assessment
in the municipality and a second class composed of the first class plus all non-owners. The system in effect
provided super-voting rights to owners.)
245
Tax concept that “people with greater ability to pay should pay higher taxes.” Westin, supra note 81, at
835.
246
See, generally, Leo P. Martinez, The trouble with taxes: fairness, tax policy, and the Constitution. 31
Hastings Const. L.Q. 413 (2004).
247
Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., supra note 192, 240 U.S. at 25 (1916).
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also upheld the Social Security Act. 248 In the 1930s, the Court heard a series of chain and
department store cases that involved state taxes basing graduation upon the size or the
enterprise measured by either revenue or number of stores in the chain. In Stewart Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewis, 249 the Court took a harsh view of Kentucky’s graduated tax imposed
on gross retail sales stating: “the operation of the statute is unjustifiably unequal,
whimsical and arbitrary,…” 250 The Court distinguished a graduated rate structure
applied to profit from one applicable to gross revenue because gross revenue provides no
information about profit. The state’s rationale that greater sales meant a greater ability to
pay the tax was not rational. 251 The Court expressed a strong preference for a graduated
income tax or a flat rate sales tax. 252 Similarly, the Court stuck down a license tax that
increased in amount on all stores in a chain whenever the chain opened a store in another
county. 253 To the contrary, Justice Cardozo, who dissented in Stewart Dry Goods, 254
wrote the majority opinion in Fox v. Standard Oil. Co. of New Jersey 255 upholding West
Virginia’s graduated, flat license tax, the amount of which per unit increased with the
number of units in the chain of vendors. The Court considered the increase rationally
related to the benefits that a member of a chain derives from the chain organization.256
Similarly, a graduated fee based upon the number of stores under the same ownership and
management withstood challenge as well. 257
The equal protection clause has played a greater role with respect to
discrimination based upon residence. A New Mexico statute that provided an annual
property tax exemption to Vietnam war veterans who were resident in the state on a
specific date discriminated against non-residents who later became residents and denied
equal protection to those veterans. 258 Similarly, while a retaliatory tax on out of state
insurers passed equal protection examination, 259 an Alabama gross premiums tax that
imposed a higher rate on out of state insurers in order to promote Alabama-based
businesses violated equal protection standards. 260 Unlike the California tax that was
designed to promote interstate commerce by discouraging other states from imposing
higher taxes on out of state insurers, Alabama’s domestic preference tax created barriers
248

Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra note 17, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937). And see discussion of the regressive structure of the tax supra in Part 2.
249
Supra note 129, 294 U.S. 550 (1935).
250
Id. at 557.
251
Id. at 559.
252
Id. at 563.
253
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933).
254
. Supra note 129, 294 U.S. at 566 (1935).
255
294 U.S. 87 (1935).
256
Id. at 97.
257
State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
258
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
259
Western and Southern Life Insurance Company v. State Board of Equalization of California, supra note
19, 451 U.S. 648 (1981). The case also establishes that discriminatory classifications of taxpayers require
only a rational state interest and basis to withstand constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection
clause rather than meeting a higher standard of constitutional review. Id. at 657.
260
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, supra note 161, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). And, similarly,
Wheeling Steel corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (invalidating Ohio’s ad valorem tax on intangible
property of a foreign corporation despite the statute’s reciprocity provision).
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to entry into the Alabama market that were “purely and completely discriminatory”
against out of state insurers. 261 Moreover, the Court observed that the domestic
preference tax bore no rational relationship to the state’s objectives. While the structure
of the tax encouraged out of state insurers to invest in Alabama assets by reducing the tax
rate relative to the level of Alabama investment, it did not require Alabama insurers to
invest in Alabama assets at all. 262
But even in those cases where geography is critical, the Court is reluctant to reject
a state taxing scheme for which it can find a rational basis. When the tax scheme
discriminates against in state taxpayers in order to encourage investment by out of state
taxpayers by exempting them from tax, the Court finds no equal protection violation.263
Similarly, when the tax discrimination directly affects residents and only incidentally
non-residents because it favors in state business, the Court has relied on state legislatures’
knowledge of local conditions and collection opportunities to uphold the tax. 264 And an
exemption from use tax for natural gas that local distribution companies enjoy while
natural gas from both in-state and out of state independent producers is not exempt
withstood equal protection challenge. The Court was unwilling to entertain the
taxpayer’s argument that natural gas from an out of state local distribution company
would be subject to use tax and held that the exemption was permissible regulation of
natural gas distribution in order to protect that market. 265
In an earlier decision, the Court found a rational basis in Vermont’s efforts to
achieve a very rough equivalence between dividends from domestic corporations that
were subject to Vermont franchise tax and foreign corporations that were not. Only
dividends from foreign corporations were subject to income tax in Vermont. Yet, the
discrimination against those dividends met equal protection standards because exempt
Vermont dividends had borne an equivalent indirect tax burden through the franchise
tax. 266 The Court observed: “absolute equality in taxation cannot be obtained, and is not
required under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 267 In the same case, however, the Court
held that Vermont’s exemption of interest earned from Vermont loans from tax
discriminated against out of state loans in violation of the equal protection clause. 268
Several decisions address challenges to formulary apportionment methods that
states use to reach part of the income of out of state taxpayers. The Court held
apportionment of railroad revenue based on the ratio of in state freight car miles to
system car miles, to be an acceptable method under equal protection challenge.269 More
261

Id. at 878.
Id. at 882-3.
263
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (exempting out of state taxpayers who store
goods in Ohio from personal property tax).
264
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (upholding a tax on out of state bank deposits fivefold as great
as the tax on in state deposits).
265
GMC v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 306 (1997).
266
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
267
Id. at 422.
268
Id. at 425.
269
Illinois C. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).
262
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recently, Michigan’s single business tax 270 apportionment value added withstood both
due process and commerce clause challenge that it discriminated against interstate
commerce. 271 The formula was internally consistent. 272 The Court approved the three
factor formula for income 273 and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted it for income that the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act apportions. 274 Since the tax is a tax on business operation in Michigan, the
apportionment formula is not unfair.275
D.
Commerce Clause Decisions. Many of the state taxation, equal protection cases
include claims under the Commerce Clause as well. Application of the Commerce
Clause to taxation matters conceptually overlaps due process and equal protection to
prevent several states from unfairly taxing the same resources. Accordingly, the taxpayer
must have sufficient contacts with the state to become subject to the state’s taxing
authority. 276 This requirement of sufficient contact with the state became particularly
important to the increasing volume of internet commerce. Congress, under the
Commerce Clause, imposed a moratorium on taxation of internet activities that limits the
states’ authority to impose tax on internet access. 277 The Multistate Tax Commission
opposes extension of the moratorium, as well as further restrictions on the states’ taxing
authority. 278
Taxpayers do win in the Supreme Court on Commerce Clause grounds when the
state statute favors in-state over out of state taxpayers so long as the reason for the
270

Mich. Comp. Laws §208.1 (2005), (repealed for years beginning after 2009), as in effect at the time of
the case, imposed a value added tax that apportions the value added that is subject to tax in Michigan for
taxpayers operating in more than one state based upon three factors: property, payroll and sales.
271
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358 (1991).
272
Id. at 380.
273
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 509 (1942).
274
7A U. L. A. 331 (1990 Cum. Supp.) (approved in 1957 by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association).
275
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. at 380.
276
For example, National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, supra note 21, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) and
Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (prohibiting a state from requiring an out-of-state
vendor having an insufficient nexus with the state to pay use taxes on its sales into the state. The vendor
had not permanent establishment in the state).
277
Internet Tax Freedom Act. Act Oct. 21, 1998, P.L. 105-277, Div C, Title XI, 112 Stat. 2681-719; Nov.
28,
2001, P.L. 107-75, § 2, 115 Stat. 703, provides:
"Sec. 1100. Short title.
"This title may be cited as the 'Internet Tax Freedom Act'.
"Sec. 1101. Moratorium.
"(a) Moratorium. No State or political subdivision thereof shall impose any of the following taxes
during the
period beginning on October 1, 1998, and ending on November 1, 2003-"(1) taxes on Internet access, unless such tax was generally imposed and actually enforced prior to
October 1, 1998; and
"(2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.
278
Eric Parker, MTC to Congress: Stop Federal Preemption on Internet Tax Issues, 108 TAX NOTES 630
(2005) (reporting on Multistate Tax Commission opposition to pending legislation).
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discrimination is to favor in-state individuals and businesses. For example, Hawaii’s
liquor excise tax discriminated against out of state producers in violation of the
Commerce Clause. 279 But Michigan’s flat registration fee for trucks making deliveries in
Michigan did not burden commerce. Taxpayers argued that the fee economically
discriminated against truckers who made few deliveries in Michigan, as Michigan did not
apportion the fee based upon mileage or some economic measure of the usage of
Michigan roads. 280
In addition, there is a line of cases under the Commerce Clause that distinguishes
unitary from non-unitary business. 281 In the case of a unitary business, the state may
apportion the taxpayer’s income from its entire unitary business and tax the apportioned
amount. 282 If the business is not unitary, the state may tax only the income attributable to
activities within the state. 283
E.
State-federal taxing issues. The federal government’s power to tax states and the
states’ power to tax the federal government have been issues of controversy over the
years. The progression of cases demonstrates the Supreme Court’s retreat from its early,
broad-based rejection of inter-governmental taxation. Early Supreme Court decisions
reflected the concern that the power to tax gave the federal government the power to
control or destroy state and local governments, and conversely. An early case, 284 held the
Income Tax Act of 1894 unconstitutional as it taxed the interest on state and local bonds.
In that case, the Court saw no difference between taxing income and taxing the source of
the income and held that Congress lacked the power to tax municipal bonds. 285
Subsequently, the Court held that taxing gain from the sale of state bonds, the interest on
which was exempt from tax, would not undermine the state’s ability to borrow or cost of
borrowing. 286 More recently, the Supreme Court overruled that part of the holding in
279

Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). The Court applied this rule retroactively to Georgia’s
excise tax in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
280
Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. PSC, 125 S. Ct. 2419 (2005).
281
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 781 (U.S. 1992) (finding no unitary
business and relying on the indicia of a unitary business: functional integration, centralization of
management and economies of scale). See, generally, Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 562-565 (St. Paul 2001) (offering various formulations of
the unitary business principle, not necessarily requiring operational interdependence but some integration
of activities).
282
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (California’s formulary
apportionment of worldwide income permissible and fair as applied to a domestic corporation): Barclays
Bank Plc v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (same, as applied to both domestic subsidiary of a
foreign corporation and foreign corporation with foreign parent doing business in California). See, note
274 supra and accompanying text for the three factor apportionment method.
283
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra note 281, 504 U.S. 768; Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho
State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (rejecting the state’s attempt to apportion income from intangibles
that were not part of a unitary business).
284
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 US 429, reh., 158 U.S. 601, supra note 164.
285
Id. at 619. “…so far as this law operates on the receipts from municipal bonds, it cannot be sustained,
because it is a tax on the power of the States, and on their instrumentalities to borrow money, and
consequently repugnant to the Constitution.” Id. at 630.
286
Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 229 (1931).
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Pollack v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust 287 and determined that Congress could choose to tax
interest on state obligations. 288
Taxation of the compensation of state employees followed a like development.
Initially, the Court determined that taxing the salary of a state judge was impermissible
taxation of the state, authority that the Constitution reserved to the state itself. 289
Similarly, the Court held that a state may not tax an employee of the federal
government. 290 But the Court gradually narrowed the limitation 291 and ultimately
overruled its early decisions, determining that intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine 292 was no barrier to a non-discriminatory tax on the salaries of federal
employees. 293 Such a non-discriminatory tax poses no threat to governmental
functions. 294 If, however, the tax discriminates in favor of employees of the state taxing
government or against employees of federal government, it is unconstitutional not as a
matter of equal protection, but because of the intergovernmental tax immunity
principle. 295 Discriminatory taxes potentially do undermine governmental functions by
placing a greater burden on them than on state functions.
F.
“Frivolous” Constitutional Arguments. Many constitutional claims that the
German Constitutional Court might decide never reach the Supreme Court because the
U.S. Supreme Court has greater control over its docket than does the German
Constitutional Court. 296 Even if a taxpayer makes a strong constitutional argument, the
taxpayer may not compel the Supreme Court to hear the argument. 297 Lower courts
reject religious freedom arguments 298 and protester arguments against the validity of the
income tax and social security tax. 299
The trend in the Supreme Court seems non-interventionist. Legislatures are best
suited to make decisions with respect to tax classifications and structures. While the
Court continues to accept cases where there is a conflict in the circuits concerning the

287

Supra note 164.
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 US 505, 525 supra note 159.
289
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 128 (1871).
290
New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937).
291
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (permitting taxation of income from government
contracts –federal); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) (likewise – state).
292
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (prohibiting the state of Maryland from taxing a United
States bank).
293
Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 483 (1939).
294
Id.at 484-5.
295
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989) (holding that exemption of state retirees’
pensions from the state income taxing while taxing federal retirees’ pensions violates the constitutional
principle of intergovernmental tax immunity).
296
Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
297
See discussion of discretionary jurisdiction by writ of certiorari supra note 8 and accompanying text.
298
In Graves v. Commissioner, 579 F2d 392 (CA6 1978), cert. denied, 440 US 946 (1979) (religious
convictions against war did not support Quakers’ claim for a war tax credit).
299
Broad range of cases. See, generally, Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution:
The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric In America, 50 Buffalo L. Rev. 819 (2002).
288
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interpretation of a tax statute, 300 the Constitution generally no longer comes into play
unless a state taxing statute treats out-of-state taxpayers 301 or federal employees
materially less favorably than its residents or state employees. 302
Part 4. Germany – Human Dignity, Equal Rights and Due Process Tax Decisions
As the U.S. Supreme Court applies an unintrusive, rational basis review to
constitutional questions in tax controversies, 303 the German Constitutional Court
examines tax legislation with a more critical eye. Unlike the Supreme Court’s inactive
role at the intersection of taxation and constitutional law development, the Constitutional
Court has been instrumental in shaping fundamental elements of German income tax
law 304 and has prompted the legislature to abolish wealth, gift and inheritance taxes.305
The Supreme Court has grafted few constitutional limitations onto federal and state
governments’ taxing authority. Only the most arbitrary legislative selections of structure,
base or taxpayer classifications fail to meet the Supreme Court’s constitutional
examination. Dissimilarly, the German Constitutional Court has applied Germany’s
basic law expansively and comprehensively to tax controversies. The court aggressively
limits legislative authority in tax matters. The Constitutional Court has actively reviewed
German federal tax legislation and has identified numerous basic law limitations upon the
German Parliament’s freedom to structure tax legislation, including a strict concept of
equality in taxation under horizontal equity principles. But, while mindful of issues of
vertical equity, the Constitutional Court has not read the Basic Law to require vertical
equity; so that both progressive tax structures like the income tax and regressive tax
structures like the turnover tax inhere simultaneously in the German tax law.306
A.
Disposable Income – Equal Rights and Human Dignity. The first article of the
Basic Law protects human dignity: “[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” 307 Combined with the social state
principle, 308 the Constitutional Court determined that the state must guarantee each
citizen a subsistence amount consistent with human dignity. 309 On the tax side, this
300

Supreme Court Rule 10, supra note 8.
Part 3C supra.
302
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, supra note 295, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)
303
Supra Part 3.
304
Part 4A infra.
305
BVerfGE 93, 121 (June 22, 1995, 2d Senat) (holding that the valuation principles of the wealth tax
violate Art 3 (equal rights) and the tax is confiscatory in violation of Art. 14 (property rights guarantee) as
it applies to unproductive property); BVerfGE 93, 165 (June 22, 1995, 2d Senat) (holding that valuation
principles in inheritance and gift tax laws inconsistent with Art. 3 (equal rights) as they do not reflect
current values of all properties fairly). Discussion infra Part 4E. See also Thuronyi, supra note 39, at 32930.
306
See discussion supra in Part 2.
307
Basic Law Art. 1 para. 1.
308
Basic Law Art. 20 para. 1.
309
BVerfGE 40, 121, 133 (June 18, 1975) (determining that the employment insurance fund need not
provide for disabled orphans beyond age 25 and allowing the legislature to determine how to provide
assistance to such individuals so long as each citizen receives social assistance to provide a subsistence
301
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principle that the state has a duty to assure each citizen “the basic needs for a humane and
dignified existence” 310 grew into a limitation on the power of the state to tax nondisposable income. As the discussion in the succeeding paragraphs clarifies, nondisposable income is that portion of the citizen’s income that the citizen must dedicate to
providing the family with the necessities of life. Expenditures necessary to producing the
income diminish income available for necessities.
A recent decision of the Constitutional Court develops from and elaborates upon
the constitutional protection of non-disposable income. 311 Under the German income tax
law, taxpayers who maintain a second household because their place of employment is
remote from the location of their principal residence may deduct the duplicative living
expenses as an expense of income production. 312 Similarly, taxpayers who receive
supplementary payments from their employers to compensate for the additional cost of a
second household when the employer assigns the employee temporarily to a remote
location may exclude the payments from their income. 313 In 1995, effective for the tax
year 1996, the legislature added a durational limit to the deduction or exclusion, so that
expenditures for the second residence after two years of employment at the remote
location ceased to be deductible and supplementary payments ceased to be excludable. 314
Designed to limit revenue loss from the dual household deduction and the exclusion from
income of the supplementary payments, the durational limit assumed that taxpayers
ordinarily would relocate their permanent residence to the employment location when the
term of employment became permanent. More than two years suggests permanence and
predominating personal rather than business reasons for continuing dual household
maintenance. 315 United States tax law follows a similar pattern with respect to the
deduction for temporary living expenses while an individual is away from home on
business although the durational limit in a single location is one year. 316 However, unlike

consistent with human dignity), and, from the tax perspective, see BVerfGE 82, 60, 85, discussed in detail
infra commencing with the text accompanying note 353 (requiring the exemption of a subsistence
minimum from the income tax). An early case, however, did not support the premise of a state subsistence
guarantee. BVerfGE 1, 97, 104 (December 19, 1951, 1st Senat) (denying a remedy under the human
dignity, equality, family protection and social state principles for inadequate social welfare assistance to a
war widow with dependent children who was unable to work).
310
BVerfGE 40 at 133 translating “die Mindestvoraussetzungen für ein menschenwürdiges Dasein.”
311
BVerfGE 107, 27 (December 4, 2002).
312
EStG §9 ¶1, Nr. 5.
313
Family separation payments (Trennungszuschläge) that do not exceed the amount deductible for
duplicative living expenses are excludable. EStG § 3 Nr. 13.
314
Id. and EStG §9 ¶1, Nr. 5.
315
BVerfGE 107, 27 at 37 (discussing the reasoning of the Federal Financial Court (Bundesfinanzhof) for
rejecting the taxpayers’ appeals of adverse lower court rulings). The Federal Financial Court
(Bundesfinanzhof) is the highest appellate court for tax matters.
316
IRC § 162(a)(2). U.S. taxpayers may deduct their expenses for meals and lodging when they are away
from home on business. While the U.S. statute addresses the matter as expenses of travel away from home
on business and does not grant expressly a duplicative living expense deduction, the statute limits the
concept of temporarily away from home on business to a one year duration.
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Germany, the United States allows no deduction to a U.S. taxpayer who changes her
permanent place of employment even if separated from her family.317
A married taxpayer whose principal place of employment differed from his
spouse’s principal place of employment successfully challenged the deduction’s
durational limit. The taxpayer was a professor who changed positions from a university
in Frankfurt (Main), Germany to Berlin, Germany, but whose self-employed wife, for
valid business reasons, retained her geographical center of business activity and
household in Frankfurt. 318 The professor maintained a secondary, smaller residence in
Berlin and sought to deduct his expenses for maintaining the secondary residence and for
weekly trips home to Frankfurt. 319 In a companion case, the taxpayer was a criminal
commissioner whom the state of Rhineland-Palatinate assigned to a national office in
Berlin 320 and who received a separation payment from the state that the taxpayer sought
to exclude from income. 321 In both instances, the Constitutional Court concluded that the
durational limitation violated the equality principle of the Basic Law.322
The Constitutional Court’s decision built upon a fifty-year decisional history
under the equality principle. While the court identified the fundamental taxation
guidelines of horizontal and vertical equity that emanate from the equality principle and
should drive taxation structures, only horizontal equity was critical to fair taxation. 323
Vertical equity is important to the income tax classification but impractical for other tax
bases. 324 The court expressed the function of the guidelines as follows:
in the interests of constitutionally mandated equality of tax burden …,
taxpayers who have the same ability to pay should be taxed equally
(horizontal tax equity), while (in the vertical direction) taxation of higher
incomes should be measured against the taxation of lower incomes. 325

317

Id. After a year at most, the taxpayer’s tax home shifts to the place of employment. Note, however, that
Germany views some expenses as related to income production and deductible that the U.S. views as
wholly personal and non-deductible, commuting expenses for example. Compare treas. reg. §1.162-2(e)
with EStG §9 ¶1, Nr. 4.
318
BVerfGE 107, 27 at 35.
319
EStG §9, ¶1, Nr. 5.in addition to the deduction for duplicative living expenses allows a deduction for the
cost of travel to the principal residence and back to the place of employment weekly.
320
BVerfGE 107, 27 at 35-6.
321
EStG §3, Nr. 13. The separation payment is one to compensate the taxpayer for duplicative living
expenses when the assignment is not sufficiently permanent to support permanent relocation.
322
The equality principle (German: Gleichheitssatz) is in Art. 3, Para. 1 of the Basic Law and reads as
follows: “[a]ll persons shall be equal before the law.”
323
BVerfGE 107, 27 at 46-7.
324
Id. The court may emphasize income taxation because the case before it is an income tax case but, more
likely, because other taxes, especially the turnover tax, by their nature tend to be regressive and,
accordingly, vertically inequitable. See discussion of regressivity in the German tax system supra in Part
II.
325
Id.at 46. Author’s translation. Emphasis added.
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Within the context of horizontal equity, the court determined that comparison of
taxpayers’ ability to pay is a function of net income. 326 In determining net
income, expenditures necessary to production of income generally are
deductible327 but not expenditures that, while incidental and helpful to income
production, relate to the taxpayer’s specific standard of living and personal
choices. 328 For example, a taxpayer may deduct duplicative living expenses
necessary to employment at a location remote from home. 329 Yet, the allowable
deduction may not exceed some average or customary level of living expenses
that does not take the taxpayer’s individual standard of living choices into
account, even if extravagant or luxurious expenditures are more consistent with
the taxpayer’s general standard of living and possibly necessary in order to meet
the expectations of the taxpayer’s business contacts. The court viewed the excess
expenditures over some general standard of living as discretionary and nondeductible rather than deductible mandatory expenditures. 330
The dichotomy between mandatory and discretionary expenditures, according to
the court, determined the permissibility of the state’s taking the funds through taxation
that the taxpayer otherwise would devote to the expenditure. 331 Although ordinary living
expenditures generally are not deductible, 332 citing its earlier decisions, the court pointed
out that aspects of childcare and education expenditures are not discretionary and,
accordingly, funds necessary for them not taxable to the degree that fully discretionary
funds are. 333 With respect to income production, certain expenditures that are personal in
nature are essential, that is non-discretionary, to income production and, therefore,
deductible. As an example, commuting expenses are deductible although the selection of
the location of one’s residence, and, indirectly commuting cost, is personal. 334

326

Id.at 47.
EStG §9.
328
EStG §12 Nr. 1 (disallowing deduction for expenditures associated with the taxpayer’s standard of
living even if they contribute to the production of income).
329
EStG §9, ¶1, Nr. 5.
330
BVerfGE 107, 27 at 48.
331
The mandatory, and, therefore, non-taxable expenditures group themselves around a subsistence
minimum that the court discusses in detail in its decision, BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, 2d
Senat), infra note 381, and accompanying text.
332
EStG §12, Nr. 1.
327

333

BVerfGE 107, 27 at 49. The court cites its earlier decisions at BVerfGE 89, 246, 253, discussed infra in
text accompanying note 395, (accepting an incremental needs standard in fixing the subsistence minimum
that the income tax must exempt, while the social welfare system used a per capita system) and BVerfGE
82, 60, 86, discussed infra note 353 and accompanying text (observing that a subsistence minimum must
remain free from the income tax). By comparison, the United States takes an ambiguous approach to
childcare expenditures, allowing a credit for a portion of dependent care expenses for some taxpayers under
IRC §21.
334
Id. at 50. EStG §9, ¶1, Nr. 4 permits a deduction for commuting costs. Under U.S. tax law, commuting
costs are personal and non-deductible. Treas. reg. §1.162-2(e). Parking expense, however, is deductible if
the employer arranges for the employee to pay for parking through a compensation reduction arrangement
under IRC §132(f)(4).
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The preceding analysis took the court to the duplicate living expense issue. The
Finance Committee of the Bundesrat that introduced the two-year time limitation saw
deductibility of temporary living expenses of a second household as a matter of
legislative grace recognizing the business necessity that affects ability to pay tax. On the
other hand, the Committee saw attribution of long-term dual housekeeping at a single
work location to business necessity to be a fiction.335
The Constitutional Court, however, considered the two-year durational limit to be
inconsistent with business reality in the case of the criminal commissioner because the
court was unable to distinguish multiple extensions of a taxpayer’s assignment to a single
work location 336 from a series of assignments lasting more than two years in the
aggregate to a series of different locations. In both instances, the uncertainty of
temporary assignments rendered permanent relocation impractical.337 Since the statutory
distinction between a single location and multiple locations caused the deduction
limitation to treat similar abilities to pay dissimilarly by treating the multiple location
worker more favorably than the multiply assigned, single location worker, that statutory
distinction violated the equality principle. 338
The two-year durational limitation on the deduction for dual household costs also
was flawed as it applied to married individuals both of whom work outside the home. 339
If the spouses’ principal occupation locales differ, the expense of maintaining a second
household is an income production expense that the tax law must take into consideration
without regard to the duration of the arrangement. The court compared two families with
similar spousal combined earnings. Both families may incur duplicative living expenses
in order to produce income when one spouse changes his or her place of employment.
Initially, the tax law acknowledges that the dual expense is a cost of producing income
and allows a deduction. 340 The single earner family may eliminate the duplication
because the family may relocate to the new place of employment. If the family chooses
to continue to maintain a dual residence, the dual residence expenditure is clearly
discretionary. On the other hand, maintenance of dual residences is mandatory for the
dual earner family so long as the spouses’ respective places of employment differ from
one another. Accordingly, a two-year durational limit to the deduction was not rational,
as it limited a deduction for non-discretionary expenditures necessary to the continued
production of income. By treating discretionary and non-discretionary expenditures the
same, the tax law failed to distinguish between dissimilarly situated taxpayers and
violated the Basic Law’s equality principle. 341 So while the statute purported to treat the
335

Id.
The commentary on the case refers to it as the Kettenabordnung decision (chain delegation or
assignment decision) because it involves the several delegations of the taxpayer to the same work locale but
no permanent assignment. The court uses the term “Kettenabordnung” in referring to the criminal
commissioner’s serial assignments. Id. at 52.
337
Id.
338
Basic Law Art. 3 Para. 1.
339
BVerfGE 107, 27 at 52-3.
340
EStG §9, ¶1, Nr. 5.
341
Basic Law Art 3.
336
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families identically, it failed to account for a material and non-discretionary
expenditure. 342 With respect to other non-discretionary expenditures, the tax law
permitted deductions to both spouses for other duplicative career expenditures such as
commuting expenses. 343
While the equality principle may have sufficed to enable the Constitutional Court
to find the durational limit for dual household expenses unconstitutional in both cases, the
court, nevertheless, relied heavily in the two career case on the family and marriage
protection principle in rendering its decision. 344 Insofar as the durational limit assumes
that the family normally would move to the work location of one spouse, it denies the
family the ability to create its own structure. Ability to relocate is a function of the
specific marital model that includes only a single wage earner. 345 The court rejected such
a model as a justification for tax rules four decades earlier. 346 The court concluded that
tax legislation must respect the basic right of families to select their own structures, dual
earner or single earner, and treat all the structures the same based upon ability to pay
given the freely chosen structure. 347
How far taxpayers will push the limits of the decision should prove interesting.
The court’s language on both the mandatory-discretionary distinction is broad, as is its
language on freedom to structure the family. Taxpayers seem likely to test the mandatory
expenditure analysis by claiming a miscellany of essential payments as mandatory and
deductible. In the U.S. a taxpayers’ organization would quickly emerge to finance
litigation to expand the scope of the deductible, mandatory expenditure concept.
Similarly, a variety of family structures would soon claim deductions for duplicative
living expenses. Claim of a deduction for the continued maintenance of separate
residences for couples who are working in different locations at the time of marriage
seems a logical next step.
Nevertheless, the dual household case broadened the range of expenditures that
the court viewed as non-discretionary and, accordingly, not subject to the income tax. 348
Earlier Constitutional Court decisions distinguished mandatory or non-discretionary
expenditures from discretionary expenditures that constitute disposable income. 349 From
an American perspective, those decisions reached the remarkable conclusion that, while
the income tax may burden disposable income freely, income that a taxpayer must devote
to meeting the basic needs of the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s family is exempt from
342

BVerfGE 107, 27 at 52-3.
EStG §9, ¶1 Nr.4.
344
Basic Law Art. 6, Para. 1 provides: “[m]arriage and family shall be under the special protection of the
state.”
345
BVerfGE 107, 27 at 53.
346
BVerfGE 6, 55 (January 17, 1957), infra note 415 and accompanying text (prohibiting mandatory joint
assessment of married individuals to produce a marriage penalty from a differential rate schedule).
347
BVerfGE 107, 27 at 56. The court also reserved judgment as to whether or not the durational limit
might violate Basic Law Art. 12 para. 1 (protecting the individual’s right to choose a profession freely) and
Basic Law Art. 3 para 2 (guaranteeing equal rights without regard to sex).
348
Supra note 333 and accompanying text.
349
BVerfGE 82, 60 (May 29, 1990, 1st Senat) and BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, 2d Senat).
343
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taxation. The leading case from a decade earlier than the dual household expense case
required that the legislature exempt a subsistence minimum for each individual and
family from the income tax. 350 In the United States, by contrast, the general rule is that
personal, living, or family expenses are not deductible, whether or not essential. 351 The
legislature may choose to tax gross income and allows deductions only as a matter of its
beneficence.352
The earlier of the decisions addresses the question whether the equality and
family protection principles of the Basic Law require that measurement of income for
income tax and social welfare program purposes be consistent with one another. 353 The
Constitutional Court acknowledged that the underlying policies that fix the tax and
welfare structures may differ from one another and apply differing income measurements
in order to achieve the policy goals of the laws. 354 The social program involved in the
case subsidized families with children with a direct payment per child – a child
supplement. The cash subsidy complemented the exemption for children in the income
tax law and provided families with additional resources.355 While all families with
children received the subsidy, families with greater incomes received only the base
amount subsidy while families with lower incomes received the base amount plus an
additional subsidy. 356 The statute that determined the amount of the subsidy measured
income differently from the income tax law. Specifically, the subsidy statute determined
the individual’s subsidy amount by aggregating his positive income from the various
income groups under the income tax law but, unlike the income tax law, permitted neither
the loss from one income group to offset the income from other groups nor the losses of
the individual’s spouse to offset the individual’s income. 357
The individual challenging the statute before the Constitutional Court suffered a
loss from his leasing activities. While the loss was deductible across income groups for
income tax computations, it was not deductible in determining his income for purposes of
fixing the child supplement. 358 Accordingly, he received only the base amount of the
350

BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, 2d Senat). This Article discusses this decision in some detail
infra commencing with the text accompany note 381.
351
IRC §262. On the other hand, Congress exercised its “legislative grace” and allowed various
deductions, including personal exemptions and a minimum standard deduction. IRC §63.
352
The longstanding premise underlying tax deductions is: “[t]he power to tax income … is plain and
extends to the gross income. Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon
legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed. New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (U.S. 1934).
353
BVerfGE 82, 60 (May 29, 1990, 1st Senat).
354
BVerfGE 82 at 102.
355
The Constitutional Court addresses itself directly to the exemption for children in BVerfGE 82, 198
(June 12, 1990, 1st Senat), discussed in text commencing with note 376 infra.
356
Id. at 63.
357
The German income tax separates sources of income into seven groups and determines and combines
the net income within each source group to form the tax base. EStG §2(1). With specific limits based upon
the taxpayer’s aggregate income, the taxpayer may deduct losses from one source group in whole or part
against income from other source groups and may deduct his or her spouse’s losses from the taxpayer’s
otherwise positive income in determining income subject to tax. EStG §2(3).
358
BVerfGE 82 at 65.
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child supplement rather than the larger supplement he would have received with the
diminished income. The Minister for Youth, Family and Health argued successfully that
the reduction in the child supplement should be a function of economic income rather
than taxable income. Taxable income, the Minster argued, takes various non-economic
adjustments into account that the tax writers designed to provide tax subsidies having
functions unrelated to ability to pay. Hence the child supplement rules for computing
income approximate better true economic income and provide a better measure of need
for the increased supplement than does taxable income. While the Minister conceded it is
not possible to measure economic income under any set of rules perfectly, the child
supplement rules are as or more reasonable than the income tax computation rules. 359
The Constitutional Court accepted the Minister’s line of argument and held that
neither the equality principle, 360 the protection of family principle, 361 nor the social state
principle 362 required a uniform base for measurement of income under the child
supplement and the income tax laws. 363 The legislature correctly may factor out tax
subsidies 364 and losses from activities that the individual does not enter with a profit
making intent 365 in ascertaining the family’s need for the increased child supplement.
Disregarding true economic losses in the computation that prohibits offsetting losses
from one income group against income in another group the court found would eliminate
the formidable administrative task of separating economic from non-economic tax losses.
Hence that imperfection that would fail to recognize some economic losses was also
constitutionally permissible. 366
In examining the structure of the child supplement, the court discovered that the
supplement did not appear to be a fundamental element of the state’s guarantee to each
citizen of subsistence consistent with human dignity. The child supplement was
independent of that subsistence minimum and was based on a far higher living standard
than subsistence. 367 Accordingly, the state could eliminate the child supplement if the
legislature chose to do so. Similarly, the family protection principle permits but does not
require the state to provide the family with any or a specific level of child supplement. 368
And the court notes that the combination of the child supplement and the tax savings
from exemption for dependent children generally is far less than the actual cost of
supporting a child so that exemption amounts and child supplements seem to serve a
purpose other than subsistence and are not subject to as strict scrutiny as subsistence
guarantees might be. 369
359

Id. at 72-3.
Basic Law Art 3 para. 1.
361
Basic Law Art. 6 para. 1.
362
Basic Law Art. 20 para 1.
363
BVerfGE 82 at 99.
364
Id.
365
Id. at 100-1.
366
Id. at 101.
367
Id. at 79-80
368
Id. at 81-2.
369
Id. at 95. But compare the decision in the subsistence exemption case discussed in the following
commencing with the text accompanying note 381 infra.
360
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In the course of its analysis of the income computation method for the child
supplement, the court observed that taxing the subsistence minimum would diminish the
taxpayer’s resources to meet basic needs. That diminution, in turn, might compel the
state to provide a direct subsidy to the taxpayer to guarantee the subsistence minimum. 370
Given the choice between protecting the subsistence minimum from the income tax and
requiring a state subsidy to increase the taxpayer’s resources to the subsistence minimum,
the court determines that exemption of the subsistence minimum from tax is the better
choice. In addition, rather than taxing all income, but assuring the taxpayer a net income
amount at least equal to the subsistence minimum, the court exempts the subsistence
minimum amount from income taxation for all taxpayers in order to protect horizontal
equity. Hence, the income tax must not tax that portion of the family’s income equal to
the subsistence minimum. 371 Any other approach would cause families with dependent
children to be at a disadvantage relative to other families, assuming that income in excess
of the subsistence minimum is disposable. 372 An example illustrates the court’s
reasoning:
Compare two families having equal amounts of disposable income, two
adult members, one with a dependent child and one without, and a tax rate
of 50%. Assume that the subsistence minimum for a two adult family is
10,000 and 5000 more for a dependent child. The first family has income
of 30,000 and the second income of 25,000. A tax rate of 50% on all
income leaves the first family with disposable income of zero (30,000 x
.50 = 15,000 tax payable in full and leaving the family with the
subsistence minimum of 15,000 after tax) and the second family with
disposable income of 2,500 (25,000 x .50 = 12,500 tax from 25,000 leaves
2,500 disposable over the 10,000 subsistence minimum). If, on the other
hand, only disposable income is taxable, each family is left with the same
amount of disposable income – 7,500 (15,000 disposable subject to 7,500
tax at 50%).
The equality principle, in conjunction with the family protection principle, requires that
tax law treat taxpayers with dependent children the same as taxpayers without dependent
children, as expenses of raising children are expenses that diminish the individual’s
ability to pay tax as opposed to discretionary personal expenses that the tax law may
disregard in assessing tax. 373 Having defined ability to pay tax in terms of disposable
370

Id. at 85. The court in the dual household cases, BVerfGE 107, 27, supra note 314, expanded this
minimum nontaxable amount to include essential family expenditures that diminish disposable income.
This and the following discussion would seem unnecessary to the resolution of the case before the court
and one would label the observations as dicta in U.S. legal analysis.
371
Id. at 85-6 relying on the dignity principle of Basic Law Art 1, para 1, the social state principle of Basic
Law Art 20 para 1 and the family protection principle of Basic Law Art 6 para 1. Here the court refers to
the income tax (and possibly other direct taxes) only, as no exemption from the turnover tax exists for lowincome families.
372
Id. at 86.
373
Id. at 87. Referred to supra note 333 and accompanying text.
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income, the court, without expressly so stating, concluded that horizontal equity demands
equal treatment of taxpayers with like amounts of disposable income. Vertical equity
does not support any other approach, so that the legislature must achieve progressivity
through increasing rates of tax on increasing amounts of disposable income. 374
Following its analysis in the child supplement case,375 the Constitutional Court
directly addressed the adequacy of the income tax exemption amount for children in a
decision the court released a couple of weeks later. 376 Despite its holding in the earlier
case that measurement of income for child supplement purposes could differ from
measurement for income tax purposes, the court confirmed in this decision that a
subsistence minimum encompassing all family members must remain free from the
income tax. 377 Adopting the methodology it applied in the child supplement case of
converting the child supplement into an exemption equivalent and adding it to the
exemption amount, 378 the court held that the supplement and exemption combined for the
years at issue failed to free the subsistence minimum from taxation. 379 That failure
violated the equality and family protection principles of the Basic Law. 380
The relationship between the social welfare system and the income tax and the
adequacy of its exemptions confronted the Constitutional Court again within a short
period. 381 Taxpayers argued that the Basic Law required an income tax exempt amount
for all taxpayers no lower than the subsistence minimum that social welfare
established. 382 In order to determine whether the Basic Law required that level of
exemption, the court traced the history of income tax law in Germany through its exempt
amounts observing that “[t]he German income tax traditionally burdens only disposable
income and frees receipts necessary to financing of basic needs … from taxation.”383
The court identified the income tax exemption as a function of the relationship that the
income tax bears to the indirect taxes, including the value added tax, by noting that
freeing the subsistence minimum from the income tax “compensated for the heavy
burden that indirect taxes imposed on poorer people.”384
374

Id. at 90.
BVerfGE 82, 60, discussed supra in text commencing at note 353.
376
BVerfGE 82, 198 (June 12, 1990, 1st Senat). The income tax exemption for children appeared in EStG
§32 Abs 8 for the years at issue in the case. The exemption now is at EStG §32 (6).
377
Id. at 206-7.
378
BVerfGE 82, 60 at 83 and following.
379
BVerfGE 82, 198 at 208.
380
Art. 3 para. 1 and Art 6 para. 2 respectively.
381
BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, II Senat), supra note 123.
382
Id. at 159.
383
Id. at 155 (author’s translation). The original German reads: “Die deutsche Einkommensteuer belastet
traditionell nur das verfügbare Einkommen und stellt die zur Finanzierung des existentiellen Bedarfs
benötigten Einnahmen … von der Besteuerung frei.”
384
Id. at 156 (author’s translation). The quote suggests that the subsistence minimum increases as indirect
taxes increase. But while protecting the subsistence minimum as defined to encompass the cost of
necessities including the turnover tax on the necessities, that exemption inures to the benefit of all
taxpayers. The exemption tends to work against vertical equity by precluding nuances of progression
among taxpayers with materially differing sums of “disposable” income. Compare statements in the
legislative history to the earned income tax credit in the U.S., I.R.C. §32. Congress intended the earned
375
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Following that historical structure, the court determined that personal freedom
and free development of the individual’s personality,385 both freedoms that taxation tends
to restrict, require that each taxpayer be left with an amount after income tax that is not
less than the subsistence minimum. At the same time, the court observed that a structure
that exempts the subsistence minimum must not disregard the principle of vertical equity
requiring progressivity in the income tax. 386
While the subsistence minima social welfare fixes in providing subsidies to
individuals do not necessarily constitute a perfect measure of subsistence, they provide a
baseline below which the income tax may impose no burden. 387 But as the social welfare
system provides social assistance based upon local conditions, subsistence minima that
social welfare administration establishes are only rough estimates of the minima. The
federal legislature must exempt an amount from the income tax that will protect the
subsistence minimum in as many instances as possible. 388 In any event, statistics
demonstrate to the court that existing exemptions fail to meet subsistence minima. 389
The court also rejected the notion that specific exemptions not applicable to all taxpayers
compensate for the inadequacy of the general exemptions. 390
Mindful of the burden that requiring refunds might impose on the German
treasury, the court chose to apply its decision with respect to subsistence minima and the
income tax prospectively. 391 Social welfare assistance would be available to taxpayers
whom the income tax might leave with insufficient resources to meet their subsistence
needs. 392 Despite prospective application, the Constitutional Court firmly established an
income tax exemption zone around the subsistence minimum and looked to the social

income credit to enable low-income families to meet the rising cost of living and to offset partially the
regressive effect of the social security tax on employed low-income individuals. HR 2166, HR Report 9419 at 10 (94th Cong. 1st Sess, Feb. 25, 1975) and more directly, S.Rep. 94-36 (94th Cong. 1st Sess, March 17,
1975) at 11 that reads in part: “[t]he credit is set at 10 percent in order to correspond roughly to the added
burdens placed on workers by both the employee and employer social security contributions.” The Senate
report suggests that Senate taxwriters believed that the employee bore the burden of both the employer’s
and the employee’s share of social security taxes. Unlike the subsistence minimum exemption in Germany,
the earned income credit phases out as taxpayers’ incomes increase.
385
Id. at 169 citing Basic Law Art. 2 para. 1.
386
Id. at 170, citing with approval BVerfGE 82, 60, 89, discussed in detail supra notes 370-374 and
accompanying text.
387
Id. at 170-71.
388
Id. at 172.
389
Id. at 174-5.
390
Id. at 176.
391
Id. at 178. Note that taxpayers who, two years earlier, successfully argued that the exemptions for
children were inadequate to meet the subsistence minimum received relief in BVerfGE 82, 198, discussed
supra beginning with note 376.
392
Id. at 180.
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welfare system to define that minimum, 393 including the effect of indirect taxes on the
individual. 394
In late 1998, the Constitutional Court traced a more detailed methodology for
determining the amount of the tax-free subsistence minimum for children. 395 The court
specified that while the social welfare amount generally would continue to provide the
floor for the minimum, certain departures from social welfare computational methods
were permissible. For example, with respect to incremental housing needs for an
additional child, social welfare used a per capita computation, but the court accepted an
incremental need standard that takes into account that no additional common area space
(kitchens, bathrooms) is necessary when the family adds a child. 396 While accepting a
shortfall tolerance of as much as 15 percent of the subsistence minimum for a child
between the tax exemption and social welfare amounts, that tolerance would diminish if
the computation for tax purposes rejects social welfare’s questionable computational
conventions such as per capita. 397
The court required that the subsistence minimum remain free of income tax at all
income levels and marginal rates of tax. 398 As Germany provided a child supplement for
each child, as well as an income tax exemption for each child, conversion of the child
supplement into its exemption equivalence became necessary to ascertain whether the
combination of the supplement and the exemption together left the subsistence minimum
per child exempt from taxation. 399 Conversion of the child supplement into a deduction
equivalent must operate at each taxpayer’s maximum marginal tax rate, lest taxpayers
with children bear a disproportional tax burden relative to taxpayers without children or
to taxpayers in higher marginal brackets exempt from tax on the full family subsistence
minimum. 400 For the tax year in question, one child, taxpaying families with marginal
393

Id. at 171.
Supra note 384 and accompanying text. As subsistence minima relate in part to the burden of indirect
taxes that each individual bears, those minima must include indirect taxes and eliminate the regressivity of
the indirect taxes through either direct welfare payments that guarantee human dignity (including payment
of indirect taxes) or exemption from the income tax of amounts necessary to the meet the minima including
the indirect taxes.
395
BVerfGE 99, 246 (November 10, 1998, 2d Senat). This decision is one of three the Constitutional Court
issued on the same day addressing the same issue but for different taxpayers and taxable years. The other
cases are BVerfGE 99, 268 (November 10, 1998, 2d Senat) and BVerfGE 99, 273 (November 10, 1998, 2d
Senat).
396
Id. at 263.
397
Id.
398
Id. at 264-5.
399
Id. at 265. See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
400
Id. The computational intricacy of this concept is important. The court’s underlying fairness principle
is that progressive rates commence for all taxpayers at the same point: income in excess or the subsistence
minimum for the family. The subsistence minimum is exempt from income tax. See the example in the
text following note 372 supra. Like any deduction, the subsistence minimum exemption is more valuable
for taxpayers subject to higher maximum rates of tax than taxpayers subject to lower maximum rates, since
deductions reduce tax at the margin. As the Constitutional Court views the subsistence minimum as an
exemption from tax, consistency demands that, in evaluating a direct subsidy like the child supplement as
satisfying part of that subsistence exemption, it must convert the subsidy into its exemption equivalent
amount. That means that the court must take tax rates in account. Accordingly, it requires a larger subsidy
394

© Copyright 2005 Henry Ordower
Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation - Germany/U.S. Constitutional Principles
Page 43

rates of 40% or more do not enjoy a full subsistence exemption. 401 While the
Constitutional Court left the Federal Financial Court to fashion the appropriate form of
remedy, the Constitutional Court was unwilling to apply its holding prospectively
only, 402 as it had done in the earlier subsistence case. 403
The Constitutional Court has shown itself to tolerate legislative and administrative
imprecision in application of the equality principle as needed to allow for generalized
approaches to taxation. For example, the court allowed a generalized approach to the
deduction for home office expenditures. 404 The statute on home office expenditures
distinguished among home offices used 50 percent or less for business for which there
was no deduction; home offices used more than 50 percent for business but that were not
the center of the taxpayer’s business activity for which the statute limited the deduction to
a specific amount; and home offices used exclusively as the center of the taxpayer’s
business activity for which all expense were deductible.405 The taxpayer argued that the
statute allowed the full cost of an outside office and placed home offices at a
disadvantage. The court, however, accepted the need to generalize in the law and
permitted the statute to stand, even though it might result in some home office users
being placed at a disadvantage. 406
Nevertheless, the legislative wish to generalize and categorize may not conflict
with the equality principle in conjunction with the protection of family principle. 407
Confronted with possible disparate treatment of families relative to one another or
families without children, recent decisions affirm both the Constitutional Court’s
commitment to a family subsistence minimum free from income taxation and a level
playing field for all taxpayers without regard to family status. 408

for higher rate individuals to convert into the same exemption amount for lower rate individuals. Hence a
€1000 subsidy to a 20% bracket taxpayer is the same as a €5000 exemption, but only a €2500 exemption to
a 40% bracket taxpayer. So a €2000 exemption is needed for the 40% bracket taxpayer to protect the same
subsistence minimum of €5000. If that outcome seems rather peculiar since a direct subsidy covers the
same amount of expenses for each family, it is nevertheless inherent in defining the subsistence minimum
as an exemption rather than providing a refundable credit against tax to all taxpayers in an amount equal to
the subsistence minimum. To a limited extent Germany does just that by providing welfare assistance to
individuals whose incomes are less than the subsistence minimum. See the Bundessozialhilfegesetz
(Federal Social Welfare Law) (June 30, 1961, version of March 23, 1994, as amended through November
25, 2003).
401
Id. at 266.
402
Id. at 267-8.
403
Supra note 391 and accompanying text.
404
BVerfGE 101, 297 (July 12, 1999, 2d Senat).
405
EStG §4 (5) 6b. Compare the U.S. restrictions on home office deductions in IRC § 280A.
406
BVerfGE 101, supra note 404, at 310.
407
Basic Law Art. 6.
408
BVerfGE 102, 127 (May 24, 2000, 1st Senat), BVerfGE , , 2 BvR 167/02 (January 11, 2005, 2d Senat)
(available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20050111_2bvr016702.html), BVerfGE , , 2 BvL
7/00 (March 16, 2005) (available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20050316_2bvl000700.html),
cases discussed in text following this note.
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In the first of these cases, 409 the taxpayer could not claim the child exemption and
did not receive the child supplement for her adult child because the child, who otherwise
met the requirements for a continuing exemption and supplement, earned income in
excess of the statutory limit. Under a statutory “cliff” loss of benefits provision in both
the income tax law and the social security law, as soon as a child’s income exceeded a
fixed sum, the benefits were lost. The taxpayer argued both that the loss of benefits
provision was unfair because it did not provide for any phased structure and that the
computational structure in the case of her child was unfair. The court reached the second
but not the first argument in finding for the taxpayer. Unlike customary employment
relationships in Germany that require the employer to reduce the employee’s
compensation by the employee’s share of social insurance payments, that withholdingtype rule did not apply to the child’s employment relationship. Accordingly, the child’s
employer did not withhold. Specifically, the child’s employer was not required to reduce
the child’s income by the amount of social security contributions, as permitted for the
specific employment relationship. Even though the child had to make the payments in
any event, the child’s income was measured for loss of benefits on a pre-social insurance
contribution basis. Other employment relationships deducted social insurance payments
from income first, so that other children with comparable gross incomes measured their
incomes for loss of benefit purposes on an after social insurance payments basis.
Accordingly, the income measurement affected the taxpayer’s child adversely relative to
similarly situated individuals with comparable incomes. The Constitutional Court held
that the equality principle required consistent measurement of income for all taxpayers,
so that the taxpayer’s child, so viewed, received income that was less than the loss of
benefits amount. The court noted that it need not answer the other argument in this case
because the income measurement issued controlled the outcome for the taxpayer.
In the second of the two decisions, 410 the Constitutional Court turned its attention
to childcare expenditures that are deductible as costs of income production. 411 The
income tax provision allowing the childcare deduction placed both a floor and a ceiling
on the deductible amount. Although the taxpayer did not challenge the ceiling, the court
commented that the ceiling seemed a reasonable accommodation to control excessive
expenditures that were in fact discretionary, rather than necessary, to facilitate parental
employment or training. The floor during the year at issue was an imputed sum based
upon the taxpayer’s filing status and income. 412 Only expenditures in excess of that
imputed amount were deductible. The court observed that the statute placed parents with
childcare expenses at a disadvantage relative to individuals with no children. Since
childcare expenditures were not discretionary but mandatory for working parents, the
floor rendered some portion of childcare expenses non-deductible. The floor resulted in
income taxation of non-disposable income, and diminution of the income tax free family
subsistence minimum in violation of equality principle combined with the protection of
409

BVerfGE , , 2 BvR 167/02.
BVerfGE , , 2 BvL 7/00, supra note 408 (March 16, 2005).
411
EStG § 33c (allowing the deduction for parents who are working or attending school or training).
Compare the limited tax credit under U.S. law, I.R.C. §21.
412
Under the current statute, the floor is a fixed sum per child.
410
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family principle. 413 The court emphasized that the principle of horizontal equity in
taxation, especially as it might affect decisions whether or not to have children, was
particularly robust. 414
B.
Marriage Penalties. Relatively early in the post-war period, the Constitutional
Court addressed a challenge to the mandatory joint assessment of married individuals
under the income tax. 415 Rate brackets in effect for 1951, the tax year at issue in the case,
applicable to jointly assessed couples were somewhat broader at lower incomes than
individual brackets, but not twice individual brackets. 416 The rate structure did benefit
some couples. If the couple had a principal income earning spouse and the other spouse
earned a small amount of income or no income, joint assessment was beneficial to the
couple as the joint brackets would free a larger amount of income from tax than would
separate filing at individual rates. 417 Where both spouses earned substantial income or
comparable amounts of income, separate assessment at individual rates would result in a
smaller tax burden for the marital unit than would joint assessment. 418
While the statute nominally required joint assessment for all spouses who lived
together for four months or more during the assessment period, 419 the implementing
regulation excluded from the joint assessment base, income that the wife earned from
employment (rather than self-employment) so long as the husband was not her
employer. 420 The regulation places the sub-classification of self-employed, married
women at a disadvantage relative to employed married women as well as both employed
and self-employed married men. The Constitutional Court easily could have decided the

413

Compare the discussion of the two residence household, supra in text accompanying and following note
331.
414
2 BvL 7/00, supra note 408, at ¶45-6.
415
BVerfGE 6, 55 (January 17, 1957).
416
Under section 32 of the income tax law of 1951 (Einkommensteuergesetz 1951 in the version from
January 17, 1952), married couples were in tax class II, individuals with children in class III and other
taxpayers in class I. Additional exempt amounts applied to classes II and III and the tax tables imposed a
smaller tax on the incomes of taxpayers of up to 5000 German Marks who were in classes II and III than
the tables imposed on class I taxpayers. Moreover, one spouse’s losses offset the other spouse’s income.
Under current law, the brackets are effectively twice the individual brackets. EStG §32a (5) assesses a
spouse on half the marital unit’s income at individual rates and doubles the amount of tax computed in that
manner. U.S. law with its separate rate schedules for individual and married taxpayers continues to
resemble the earlier German model, the joint filing brackets are broader than unmarried individual bracket
but not twice as broad, and married filing separately brackets are half the breadth of the joint brackets. IRC
§1(a), (c), (d). Note, however, that IRC §1(f)(8) makes the joint filing brackets equal to twice the single
individual brackets for the 15% bracket for the 2003 and 2004 tax years and again for 2008 through 2010
with smaller sizes for the intermediate years.
417
For example, a single earner family with income of 5000 German Marks drew a tax 652 Marks in Class
II while a Class I taxpayer would have paid 810 Marks. Einkommensteuergesetz 1951 Table B.
418
If married taxpayers each had income of 2500 Marks (total 5000), each would pay 235 Marks for a total
tax of 470 Marks if they were separate Class I taxpayers, but 652 Marks on the combined income as Class
II taxpayers. Einkommensteuergesetz 1951 Table B.
419
Id. at 56. Einkommensteuergesetz 1951 §26.
420
Section 43 of the implementing regulation to the income tax law (EinkommensteuerDurchführungsverordnung in the version of January 17, 1952) §43.
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case on narrow equality principle grounds as discriminatory against the sub-class.
Instead the court chose not to address that discrimination as its decisional basis.421
After disposing of the procedural limitation that pre-constitutional law might
impose on the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction,422 the court traced the rather interesting
history of the rather peculiar selection of self-employed, married women for mandatory
joint assessment on their earnings.423 Early tax laws in Prussia assessed family income as
a unit and later freed certain household members from common assessment. Legislation
from 1921 separated the wife’s income from services from her income from other sources
and permitted separate assessment of that service income. During the period that the
National Socialist controlled the German government, the government included the
wife’s income from services again in the joint assessment. According to the secretary of
finance at that time, the goal of the inclusion was for the political purpose of forcing
women out of the labor market. The subsequent exception for income from services as
an employee became necessary, as the war demanded that women return to the work
force to support the war effort. 424
The Constitutional Court examined the protection of marriage principle that the
Basic Law includes 425 and rejected mandatory joint assessment in so far as it burdened
rather than benefited marriage. 426 Arguments in favor of joint assessment were that the
mandatory joint assessment was permissible to educate spouses and to shape the marital
relationship in the best interests of the family and the state. The court firmly rejected
both arguments on protection of marriage and sexual equality grounds.427 Interpretation
of the protection of marriage principle must be consistent with other constitutional
protections. 428 Equal rights means that the spouses always must remain free to select the
structure of the relationship without any economic pressure from the state, in the form of
an increased tax burden, to choose one earner rather than two earner household status.
Thus, the Constitutional Court left no opening for modification of the joint assessment
that would impose a greater tax burden on a married couple than on two unmarried
individuals.429
421

BVerfGE 6 at 83 raising the Basic Law Art. 3 issues within the group of married individuals but not
relying on them for the decision.
422
Id. at 64.
423
Id. at 67.
424
Id. at 65-66. Perhaps the recitation of the history and its link to the national socialists compelled the
court to conclude that the joint assessment was unconstitutional, as one cannot imagine that the court would
subscribe to a rationale emanating from the politics of that regime.
425
Art 6, para. 1.
426
Such an increased tax burden on the spouses that attaches to the conclusion of marriage … is
inconsistent with Art. 6, para. 1 of the Basic Law. BVerfGE 6 at 70. (Author’s translation).
427
Id. at 82 relying on Art. 3, para. 2 in addition to Art. 6.
428
Id.
429
Spouses may elect joint or separate assessment under current law. EStG §26 (1). As the tax is measured
as if each spouse received half the income, joint assessment is advantageous for single earner marital units
and two earner units in which one spouse, if assessed separately, would not pay tax at the margin at the
maximum rate. For other units, joint assessment produces the same tax liability as separate assessment
would.
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Similarly, the Constitutional Court ruled that the disallowance of a deduction for
salary paid to one’s spouse in computing one’s liability for the municipal business tax 430
was unconstitutional 431 as it likewise violated both the equality principle 432 and the
protection of marriage provision. 433 Although the income tax permitted a deduction for
salary paid to one’s spouse, the municipal business tax at issue in the case denied the
deduction. The legislative reasoning for denying the deduction was to protect the tax
base. As business owners could not deduct payments to themselves because such
payments would undercut the tax base, they should not be able to undercut the base by
hiring their spouses – a seemingly transparent way to avoid the deduction limit for the
salary of the business proprietor. Despite this rationale, the Constitutional Court saw the
disallowance as favoring non-spousal employees over spousal employees in violation of
equality principles and as a tax burden on marriage. The limitation on deductibility
would not arise if the individuals lived together but did not marry.
Following the Constitutional Court’s decision prohibiting mandatory joint
assessment of married couples,434 the German legislature revised the income tax law to
permit, but not require, married taxpayers to elect joint assessment. 435 Married couples
who elect joint assessment combine their incomes, determine the tax for an individual on
one-half that combined income and double the amount of tax. 436 While joint assessment
and income splitting is beneficial to taxpayers for whom it moderates tax progression,
joint assessment will never result in a greater tax than the combined tax the couple would
pay on their separately assessed incomes. 437
Elective joint assessment for married couples was not without controversy.
Single taxpayers with dependent children argued that they too should enjoy the tax
benefit of income splitting because of the cost of caring for children.438 While
acknowledging that a married couple without children enjoyed a more favorable tax
position through income splitting than unmarried individuals with dependent children, the
Constitutional Court was unwilling to find fault with income splitting.439 Instead, the
Constitutional Court determined that splitting was not a tax subsidy but rather enabled
couples to structure their economic arrangements within the marriage without concern for
the tax impact of the choice. 440 Essentially, splitting assigns value to one spouse’s work
at home caring for the household and children equal to that of the other spouse’s work for

430

Gewerbesteuer probably translates better as a business enterprise tax but as municipal governments
impose the tax, common translation is as above.
431
BVerfGE 13, 290 (Jan. 24, 1961).
432
Art 3 of the Basic Law.
433
Art 6.
434
BVerfGE 6, 55, supra note 415. See discussion in text accompany and following the cited note.
435
EStG §26. In the absence of an election, joint assessment is presumptive under EStG §26(3).
436
The German tax law refers to the method as income splitting. EStG §32a (5).
437
BVerfGE 108, 351, 355 (1st Senat, Oct. 7, 2003).
438
BVerfGE 61, 319 (March 11, 1982)
439
Id. at 351.
440
Id. at 345-6.
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compensation, 441 consistent with the equal rights 442 and marriage protection provisions of
the Basic Law. 443 As to the single parent issue, the court acknowledged the validity of
the claim on other grounds and viewed the issue in the similar light to its subsistence
minima decisions. 444 Holding that the deductions and exemptions available to single
individuals with dependent children were inadequate to free the basic costs of caring for
children from taxation, 445 the court directed the legislature to eliminate the problem but
left to the legislature the task of formulating the necessary remedy. 446
More recently, the Constitutional Court reviewed the interplay of income splitting
and maintenance obligations to a former spouse following divorce. 447 The amount of
maintenance payable to a former spouse who cannot support herself448 is a function of
the marital standard of living that preceded the divorce (taking in account likely changes
that already had affected the marital standard before the divorce). 449 In turn, standard of
living is a function of available resources and takes taxes payable into account. To the
extent that the couple elected and derived a benefit from joint assessment and income
splitting before divorce, 450 the divorce terminates availability of the election. After
divorce, a limited form of actual income splitting becomes available. A former spouse
paying maintenance may deduct some or all of the maintenance payments so long as the
recipient consents to including the maintenance payment in her income. 451 Loss of the
more general income splitting election may increase the payer’s income tax and diminish
resources available to him with which to pay maintenance. The divorce court must take
that diminution of resources into account in fixing the maintenance obligation.
441

Id. at 346. And see Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at 122. Note, however, that the court does not address
the imputed, but untaxed income, that the spouse working at home generates. Neither Germany nor the
U.S. taxes imputed income from labor for one’s immediate family and does not even take cost savings from
avoiding the cost of payment to a third party for housework into account. See, generally, Nancy C.Staudt,
Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996) (arguing that failure to tax housework forces many women
into the labor market to find a value and appropriate compensation for their labor).
442
Basic Law Art. 3 para. 1
443
Basic Law Art. 6 para. 1.
444
Discussed supra in Part IV.A.
445
BVerfGE 61, supra note 438, at 353-4.
446
BVerfGE 61, supra note 438, at 354.
447
BVerfGE 108, 351, supra note 437.
448
Statistically far more women in Germany and the U.S. receive maintenance or alimony than men, hence
the selection of a feminine pronoun for the recipient of maintenance.
449
BVerfGE 108, 351, supra note 437, at 353 citing the Civil Code (das Bundesgesetzbuch) § 1578 para. 1,
sentence 1.
450
EStG §§26, 32a (5).
451
EStG §10 (1) 1. Under current law, the payer’s deduction may not exceed €13,805 per annum. EStG
§22 1a includes the maintenance payment in the recipient’s income only to the extent of the payer’s
deduction. According to the Constitutional Court, the payer must indemnify the recipient who consents to
the inclusion in her income from the tax cost of the inclusion. BVerfGE 108, 351, supra note 437 at 356.
The indemnification is not a statutory requirement but the result a fair exchange of consent for the
indemnity as confirmed in case law. See PALANDT BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Civil Code) 1489
(Munich 1999). U.S. law provides similarly for actual income splitting through alimony (without a ceiling
on the deduction and inclusion) under I.R.C. §§71, 215. The payer’s deduction is an adjustment to gross
income under I.R.C. §62(a)(10), and not an itemized deduction under I.R.C. §63, so that the deduction
provides a tax benefit to the payer even if the payer does not itemize his deductions.
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When the individual who is obligated to pay maintenance remarries, the new
marriage entitles the spouses to elect joint assessment and income splitting.452 Income
splitting in the new marriage may decrease the maintenance paying individual’s tax
burden and increase his economic resources accordingly. 453 In the combined cases
before the Constitutional Court, 454 divorced spouses receiving maintenance payments in
such remarriage situations successfully claimed in the lower courts that the protection of
marriage principle entitled them to share in the increased resources that the new income
splitting election generated. 455 The Constitutional Court ruled, however, that the income
splitting opportunity belonged to the new marriage, so that, that protection of marriage
principle required that any increased resources remain with the new marriage. 456
C.
Assessment, Collection and the Equality Principle. Perhaps the most radically,
far-reaching of the Constitutional Court’s tax decisions is its recent securities speculation
case. 457 In that decision the court held that the equality principle 458 precluded assessment
and collection of the tax on speculation profits from trading in securities because most
taxpayers easily evade that tax. Thus, the structural deficiency in execution of the tax
law 459 rendered the application of the tax law to honest taxpayers unfair. 460
Unlike the possible constitutional barrier to taxing unrealized gains in the United
States, 461 there is no constitutional barrier to taxation of capital gain in Germany. 462
However, Germany did not (and does not) treat individuals’ capital gains as income, 463
except the gains from speculation in securities having a holding period in the taxpayer’s
hands of not more than six months. 464 The statute sought to tax those gains that might
result from the conduct of trading activity, rather than simple capital appreciation while
452

EStG §§26, 32a (5).
In the instances before the Constitutional Court, the increase in resources was a function of the
applicable tax table to use for the wage tax (Lohnsteuer), a tax collection method that is similar to wage
withholding in the U.S. I.R.C. §3401 et. seq.
454
BVerfGE 108, 351, supra note 437.
455
Id. at 352, one case comes from the state appellate court in Brunswick (Oberlandesgericht
Braunschweig) and the other from the state appellate court in Stuttgart (Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart).
456
Id. at 369.
457
BVerfGE 110, 94 (March 9, 2004, 2d Senate), supra note 30.
458
Basic Law 3(1).
459
In German: ein strukturelles Vollzugsdefizit (author’s translation).
460
Compare the U.S. exemption of the capital gains of non-resident aliens and foreign entities not engaged
in a U.S. trade or business. I.R.C. §§871(a) and 881(a) do not include capital gain in the income that is
subject to withholding. Congress exempted capital gains because it was impractical to collect tax on the
gain. See Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 862 (1946)
(permitting taxation of royalties under the predecessor to I.R.C. §871 and discussing legislative history of
inability to tax capital gains).
461
Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 12, discussed in note 169 and accompanying text.
462
BVerfGE 26, 302, 312 (July 9, 1969, 2d Sen.).
463
See, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
464
BVerfGE 110, 94, 95-6 quoting in part §23 of the Income Tax Law as in effect in 1998 referring to
speculation activities. Under current law, the provision refers to private sale activities and encompasses
securities the taxpayer has held for no more than one year. EStG §23(1) 2. Compare short term capital
gain under I.R.C. §1222(1).
453
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enjoying a possible income benefit from the investment through dividend or interest
income. 465
The statute, however, did not provide for a withholding tax on those gains 466 or
informational reporting by third party intermediaries. 467 The taxing agency lacked
authority to go on a fishing expedition 468 into private and third party records, and privacy
rights prevented banking and other third parties from providing information on
transactions to the taxing authorities in the absence of an express and specific reporting
obligation. Moreover, during the years at issue, the tax authorities made no meaningful
effort to identify short term trading profits from securities through regular audit activities.
Hence there was little threat of detection to encourage taxpayers to report honestly. 469
While the statute imposed a reporting obligation on taxpayers, the Constitutional Court
observed that the tax would act as a penalty for honest taxpayers who reported their
activities but generally would fail to reach taxpayers who failed to report. 470 In effect but
not in form, the statute imposed a greater tax burden on honest taxpayers than it did on
dishonest taxpayers and so violated the equality principle. 471
The Constitutional Court expressly limited its decision to the trading of securities
in the taxable years 1997 and 1998. 472 As the essence of the decision is lack of and
barriers to enforcement rendering assessment and collection from honest taxpayers a
violation of horizontal equity principles, the decision might extend to other activities,
including independent personal services. The court seeks to anticipate and prevent those
arguments by identifying differences in assessment and collection for other activities.
For short term dealing in real estate that the same statute governs, 473 as opposed to
holding real estate for income production or personal use, the court noted that
information reporting prevented the level of tax evasion present with respect to securities
465

Id. at 98. The Constitutional Court cites decisions of the Federal Financial Court to explain that the
statute in question, EStG §23, in the case of land speculation, sought to distinguish those taxpayers who
held land in order to derive income from operation or farming of the land from those taxpayers who
primarily speculated in the value of the land itself by buying and selling land over relatively short holding
periods.
466
EStG §38 (employer withholding of wage tax); §43, 44 (entity withholding on dividends, creditor
withholding on interest).
467
Germany lacks the extensive array of information reporting that Ch. 61, Subch. A, Part III, I.R.C. §6031
et seq., requires of U.S. persons. See discussion in Roman Seer, Besteuerungsverfahren, supra note 60 at
62-63 and 128 (Tabelle 15, Kontollmitteilungspflichten).
468
Colloquial (author’s translation of the equally colloquial ‘ins Blaue hinein’ that the court uses at
BVerfGE 110, 94, 115.
469
Id. at 114-15.
470
Id. at 104. Compare BVerfGE 84, 239 (June 27, 1991) (holding for similar reasons that taxation of
interest income was unconstitutional but delaying application of the decision to give the tax authorities time
to equalize collection of the tax).
471
As the court relies on the indirect evidence from market conditions yielding considerable profits without
offsetting losses during the years at issue to support its conclusion of unequal tax burdens, the court
reserves judgment as to any unconstitutional impact of enforcement of the statute in years after 1998 when
market losses may have offset the market gains. Id. at 140-1.
472
Id. at 111.
473
EStG §23(1).
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trading. 474 Transfers of land require participation of a notary, 475 has a reporting
obligation for tax on real property acquisition. 476 With respect to leasing activities, the
income from which taxpayers might not report, the court notes that taxpayers generally
hold the property for extensive periods and have an incentive to report income because
they will wish to deduct their losses from the activity. 477
In other areas where Germany has a serious problem with the underreporting of
income, the court finds that the taxing authority’s collection efforts differ materially from
those for short term securities trading. For example, the Constitutional Court anticipates
and dismisses the possible argument of taxpayers, who are not employees and, therefore,
not subject to the withholding mechanisms of the wage tax. Those taxpayers might argue
that the underreporting problem in the underground economy 478 causes the taxation of the
income from the services of honest taxpayers who do report unfair because their tax
burden exceeds that of dishonest taxpayers who the tax system cannot identify and
control. 479 Thus they might argue that taxation of independent service income then
similarly would violate the equality principle, that is, “the constitutional requirement of
actual identical taxation burden through identical law enforcement” 480 would be lacking.
To that argument, the Constitutional Court observes that unconditional tax audits for such
income, as contrasted with the dearth of audit activity for short term securities trading,
pose more that an incidental risk of discovery for the underreporting taxpayer. Thus,
unlike securities trading, the assessment system does not invite under- or non-reporting of
income from services. 481 Similarly, the taxing authorities programmatically and actively
seek to discover offshore investment in order to tax income from that capital. 482
D.
Retroactivity. An early series of three decisions established the principle that a
rate increase during a tax year may apply to the whole year 483 but that a rate increase may
474

BVerfGE 110, 94 at 132.
Civil law legal systems assign a major role to notaries who prepare transfer documents and handle many
of the tasks that attorneys carry out in the United States.
476
Grunderwebsteuergesetz §18.
477
BVerfGE 110, 94 at 132.
478
Schattenwirtschaft (shadow economy).
479479
Like the U.S., Germany has a substantial segment of its economy that escapes taxation because
service providers receive payments in cash that the service recipient does not report. The German term for
such work is Schwarzarbeit (black work or black market work) and was estimated to represent some 16
pecent of Germany’s gross domestic product in 2001, increasing gradually from 12% in 1990. Annette
Mummert and Friedrich Schneider, 58 FinanzArchiv 286 (2001), estimated to be 643 billion German
Marks in 2001 (€ 329 billion). Id. Note, however, that insofar as the unreported income in Germany
involves low wage workers, as it does in the U.S., those workers would not pay income tax in any event
because of the subsistence minimum that is exempt from income tax. The unreported income becomes
subject to the turnover tax just as fully reported income does when the workers consume goods and
services, so there is no loss of revenue that the government otherwise would collect. See discussion of the
relationship between the turnover tax and the subsistence minimum exemption supra in Part 2. Hence the
revenue loss with such work primarily is a function of taxes and mandatory contributions for social welfare.
480
Translating BVerfGE 110, 94 at 112: “das verfassungsrechtliche Gebot tatsächlich gleicher
Steuerbelastung durch gleichen Gesetzesvollzug ….”
481
BVerfGE 110, 94 at 133.
482
Id. at 133-34.
483
BVerfGE 13, 274 (December 19, 1961, 2d Senate).
475
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not apply to a closed year 484 unless taxpayers reasonably anticipate that an unset rate
must become fixed. 485 The outcome of the first cited case matches the result in the
United States. 486 But the strict limitation that the second case imposes to limit
retroactivity to the current year does not apply in the United States when the change is a
rate or base change, rather than the imposition of a new tax. 487 The German cases rely on
the rule of law principle emanating from the constitutional definition of Germany as “a
democratic and social federal state.” 488 The principle requires that citizens have the
opportunity to know what the law is so that they may conform their behavior and modify
their transactions to use the law most effectively.
E.
Value Dependent Taxes and the Equality Principle. The Constitutional Court held
both wealth tax 489 and the inheritance tax 490 to be inconsistent with the equality
principle. 491 Both the wealth tax law and the inheritance tax law used the valuation
standards and methods that the valuation law provided. 492 Other than rental real property
and real property used as part of a business for which capitalization of earnings provided
the value, fixed values applied to real property under the valuation law. The fixed values
were 1964 assessment values multiplied by 1.4. Since securities were valued at market
and productive property at capitalization of earnings or, in the case of property not in
production, but productive, capitalization of estimated earnings as productive, the values
of those properties were reasonably up to date. Real property, on the other hand, tended
to be undervalued substantially, as the overall real estate market had advanced
considerably since 1964. Applying the same rate of tax to real estate as to other property
meant that taxpayers whose wealth or inheritance concentrated itself in real estate paid
disproportionately lower taxes than taxpayers who owned or received other property.
That disparity violated the equality principle and rendered both statutes
unconstitutional. 493
484

BVerfGE 13, 261 (Dec. 19, 1961, 2d Senate).
BVerfGE 13, 279 (December 19, 1961, 2d Senate). however in this case the rate was set nine months
into the year, so that the earlier cases might have sufficed to decide this case as well.
486
Darusmont v. United States, supra note 153.
487
Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F2d 514 (CA2, 1942), cert. denied 317 US 655 (1942).
Debate concerning this issue of retroactivity continues in the US. See articles cited supra note 153.
Congress often announces effective dates in advance of enactment so that taxpayers are on notice of
pending, retroactive changes.
488
Art 20 of the Basic Law generates the Rechtstaatprinzip.
489
BVerfGE 93, 121, supra note 28, (June 22, 1995). The Wealth Tax Law of 1974
(Vermögensteuergesetz), (in the version of November 14, 1990, most recently amended by the law of
September 14, 1994) applied to the case.
490
BVerfGE 93, 165, supra note 28, (June 22, 1995). The Inheritance and Gift Tax Law of 1934
(Erbschaftsteuer- und Schenkungsteuergesetz), (in the version of February 19, 1991, last amended
September 27, 1994) (current version available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/erbstg_1974/index.html)applied to the case.
491
Basic Law Art. 3(1). Compare, supra note 234 and accompanying text, discussion of Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission Of Webster County, West Virginia, 488 U.S. 336,.
492
Valuation Law (Bewertungsgesetz), version of February 1, 1991 (current version available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/bewg/index.html).
493
BVerfGE 93 at 144 and at 176. The wealth tax has not been in effect since January 1, 1997. The
inheritance tax continues to apply and the parliament amended the valuation law to use more realistic
485
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With respect to the wealth tax, the Constitutional Court expressed concern about
the level of all taxes on production and stated the principle of halves to prevent taxes
from confiscating the property itself, half of the production for private use and half to
public use. 494 Further, in order to equalize the burden between productive and
unproductive property, the court stated that all values for productive property must use an
estimated, rather than an actual production, for capitalization in order to provide a level
field of valuation. 495 The court did not express the same confiscation concern about the
inheritance tax although it did observe that the inheritance tax should not be so high as to
jeopardize continuation of a going concern by diminishing its resources. 496
F.
Turnover Tax and the Equality Principle. Where medical unions that provided
laboratory services to practitioners were exempt from the turnover tax, but independent
laboratories were not, the Constitutional Court held that the preference violated the
equality principle. 497 The court was concerned that the turnover tax exemption provided
a tax advantage that interfered with free competition. Similarly, the Constitutional Court
held that the equality principle prohibits imposition of a higher turnover tax rate for
medical practitioners operating through entities than on sole practitioners. 498 These cases
are concerned with competition between or among individuals and entities operating in
the same economic activity, rather than the impact of the tax upon the consumer who
bears the burden of the tax.
In other cases, the Constitutional Court has proven far less receptive to claims of
unequal treatment of taxpayers under the turnover tax than under other taxes. The court
held that a significantly lower turnover tax rate for small businesses with gross receipts
under 60,000 German marks than for other enterprises was a reasonable exercise of
legislative discretion and did not violate the equality principle. With the significant
general rate increase, the legislature carved out the exception because it was concerned
that the small businesses would not be able to pass the higher rate on to their
customers. 499 In a case addressing the credit for the pre-tax on imported milk powder,
failure to adjust the computation for the specific industry, rather than using a generalized
computation, did not violate the equality principle. Some inequalities were unavoidable
to efficient tax administration. 500 And imposition of the full rate of turnover tax on
musical recordings, while reductions in rate or exemptions from the turnover tax existed
for many other cultural endeavors, including books, theater productions, and concerts, did
not violate the equality principle. 501 The court held that the legislature analyzed and
multipliers for real property in order to approximate current fair market values. Valuation Law Supp.
(BewG Anlagen) 6-8 in the version last amended December 20, 2001.
494
Id. at 138, supra note 113 and accompanying text.
495
Id. at 137.
496
Id. at 176.
497
BVerfGE 43, 58 (October 26, 1976, 1st Senat).
498
BVerfGE 101, 151 (November 10, 1999, 2nd Senat).
499
BVerfGE 37, 38 (March 19, 1974, 1st Senat).
500
BVerfGE 31, 145, 179 (June 9, 1971, 2d Senat).
501
BVerfGE 36, 321 (March 5, 1974, 1st Senat).
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grouped cultural activities, in part, on the basis of which activities would need a tax
diminution in order to retain their profitability, a political decision properly within the
expertise of the legislature. Records enjoyed a strong market position. 502 No case raised
the question of the regressive impact of the turnover tax on consumers.
Part 5. Conclusion. Relative to the limited impact of U.S. Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence on taxation, the German body of constitutional law based taxation
decisions is vast. While the United States Supreme Court confirms the power of the
legislature to classify taxpayers, so long as those classifications have a rational basis, the
German Constitutional Court’s decisions reflect near hypersensitivity to classifications of
taxpayers that may limit those taxpayer’s individual rights in any manner or cause some
taxpayers to receive less favorable tax treatment than others. Explanatory hypotheses for
these differences include:
1.
That the constitutions differ, such that German constitutional protections are more
robust than comparable U.S. protections, whether that robustness is intrinsic or a function
of the existence of a specialized constitutional court.
2.
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the German Constitutional Court has no simple
method like denial of certiorari to enable it to refuse to hear significant constitutional
questions. Moreover, the German court’s tunnel vision compels it to resolve
constitutional questions rather than resorting to statutory grounds for a finding, so that it
defers less to the legislature than does the U.S. Supreme Court. The Constitution Court
may view its role as a mandate to ferret out constitutional infirmity and resolve it against
the administration and legislature.
3.
That, alternatively, United States constitutional protections are more durable; the
Court reverses its precedents only rarely. The Supreme Court is very careful and
conservative in offering constitutional protection.
4.
The Supreme Court is a court of general jurisdiction and prefers to decide cases
on grounds other than the Constitution rather than addressing the constitutional issue.503
The strong United States tradition of separation of powers causes the Court to avoid,
whenever possible, conflict with the legislature and to leave most policy matters to the
legislature under the Court’s policy of judicial restraint.
5.
That the differences reflect maturation. Earlier in U.S. constitutional history, the
Supreme Court more readily struck down tax provisions but with time, it became more
respectful of legislative choices. Perhaps the same development will occur in Germany
as the Constitutional Court matures.

502

Id. at 340-1.
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Justice Brandeis concurring but
stating the principle that courts should dispose of cases without deciding constitutional issues whenever
possible).

503
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Support exists for each of these hypotheses.
Germany’s history suggests that the first hypothesis is valid. It explains the
emphasis on individual rights and the Constitutional Court’s reluctance to permit any
limitations of those rights. Emerging from the barbarism of its World War II period,
during which the National Socialist German government mandated violation of human
rights on an unprecedented scale, occupied West Germany adopted its Basic Law and
established a court to protect rights under that Basic Law. 504 The Basic Law confirmed
Germany’s present and future commitment to protection of human dignity, rule of law
and absolute prohibition of discrimination. The Basic Law guarantees showed a
Germany committed to distancing itself from its repressive and genocidal past and
facilitated Germany’s reentry into a civilized and peaceful Europe as an equal
participant. 505 West Germany positioned the individual rights guarantees in the Basic
Law in order to give them paramount importance. Unlike the U.S. Constitution that
emphasized the structure of the government and added individual rights as an
afterthought in the Bill of Rights, protection of individual rights appears at the beginning
of the Basic Law. 506 Furthermore, the delineation of basic rights is specific with express
protections of marriage, family, prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of sex, and,
the first article directing all state power to protect human dignity. And, unlike most other
provisions of the Basic Law, Germany prohibits emendation of the individual rights
guarantees. 507 While the same protections, other than sex discrimination, exist under the
U.S. Constitution, many of them have emerged through constitutional interpretation.508
As to the second hypothesis, the Basic Law limits the Constitutional Court’s
jurisdiction to constitutional questions.509 Thus, if the court addresses a tax question at
all, it must view the tax controversies in constitutional law terms. The U.S. Supreme
Court, on the other hand, easily may avoid constitutional questions by determining that a
taxing statute is inapplicable to a specific factual situation on technical grounds. The
Supreme Court controls statutory interpretation. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court
does not have the same autonomy as the Supreme Court with respect to its docket.
Review by the Supreme Court generally lies within the Court’s discretion. 510 The Basic
504

See, generally, H.W. Koch, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GERMANY at 342-3 (London 1984).
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Agreed Anglo-American Translation) (1949). The
states of West Germany adopted the Basic Law in May 1949 with the Preamble reading in part:
“Conscious of its responsibility before God and mankind, filled with the resolve to preserve its national and
political unity and to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, …” The Preamble also
intends the Basic Law to apply to those Germans who could not participate in the process, i.e., the German
Democratic Republic. Parliament amended the Preamble to include the former GDR states and to
emphasize Germany as part of a united Europe following reunification in 1990.
506
Basic Law Art. 1 – 20.
507
Basic Law Art. 79 (3).
508
For example, Basic Law Art. 11 expressly guarantees the right to travel, a right established by
interpretation, inter alia, of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. “The right to travel is a part of the
"liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.”
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958)
509
Basic Law Art. 93. The Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is slightly broader but in no way pertinent to
tax law.
510
Supreme Court Rule 10, supra note 8.
505
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Law requires lower courts to refer constitutional issues to the Constitutional Court and
suspend their proceedings until the Constitutional Court rules whenever a Basic Law
interpretation is critical to resolution of a case. 511 Lacking the luxury of nonconstitutional interpretation, the German Constitutional Court either must decide the
constitutional question that caused referral or determine that, contrary to the other court’s
analysis, the constitutional question is not critical to the case. If the Constitutional Court
decides that the constitutional issue is not critical to the case, it must remand the case to
the referring court even if it differs from the lower court on a substantive, but nonconstitutional, issue in the case. Given that choice, the Constitutional Court may choose
to exercise jurisdiction in instances in which a U.S. Supreme Court would have avoided
the constitutional question. 512 Perhaps the Constitutional Court, whether or not
consciously, protects its own relevance by deciding issues on constitutional grounds that
another court might have resolved on non-constitutional grounds.
Moreover, the Basic Law denies other courts the power to avoid constitutional
issues – if a constitutional issue is significant to the case, referral of the constitutional
issue to the Constitutional Court is mandatory. 513 Lest courts risk being viewed as
insensitive to individual rights, they, especially early in the post-war period, may have
opted to identify constitutional issues and refer the case to the Constitutional Court. Over
sensitivity to constitutional matters after the war was certainly preferable to under
sensitivity.
The third hypothesis emerges from the common law’s reliance on a system of
precedents and the rule of stare decisis. 514 Once the Supreme Court elects to decide an
issue on constitutional grounds, its decision is the law of the land, despite subsequent
legislative enactments. Only when the weight of later decisions that have limited or
distinguished an earlier opinion makes overruling the earlier decision almost inevitable,
does the Court reverse its position. 515 Changes in the composition of the Court may
result in the Court’s greater willingness to limit the holding in an earlier decision or to
distinguish a case before the Court from existing precedent,516 but overruling earlier
decisions is exceptional: “[s]tare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.” 517
511

Basic Law Art. 100.
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) (suspending decision on
constitutionality of a state tax pending state court resolution of applicability of the tax); Also
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, supra note 503.
513
Basic Law Art. 100.
514
“To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 4TH EDITION 1577 (St. Paul
1951).
515
South Carolina v. Baker, supra note 159, 485 U.S. at 524 acknowledges the gradual overruling of
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., supra note 164, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), with respect to the issue of
intergovernmental tax immunity.
516
Consider the controversial issue of abortion. Since the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
only Justice Rehnquist, a dissenter, remains on the Court. Yet, while the Court has limited or distinguished
subsequent cases, it has not overruled Roe v. Wade.
517
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, dissenting).
512
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The fourth hypothesis goes to the United States’ governmental system, separation
of powers and judicial review. As a general policy matter, the Supreme Court avoids
constitutional questions whenever possible. In abstaining from deciding a constitutional
challenge to a state tax statute until the state court interprets applicability of the tax, the
Court writes: 518
If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality -- here the distribution of the taxing power as between the
State and the Nation -- unless such adjudication is unavoidable.
Similarly, in a case challenging a statistical sampling the Census Bureau proposed to
apportion representation in the House of Representatives, the Court concluded that the
Census Act did not authorize the sampling method. Since the Court decided the case on
statutory ground, it did not address the constitutional challenges. 519 The Court’s
reluctance to exercise judicial review of statutes is understandable as it places the Court
into conflict with the legislature. Since the Constitution delegates the legislative function
to Congress, judicial review, in the Court’s tradition, remains extraordinary. Chief
Justice Rehnquist emphasizes this point: 520
Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure
requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with
the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it
hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by
other branches of government where the claimant has not suffered
cognizable injury.
Separation of powers is entrenched in the American legal tradition,521 and judicial
restraint is essential to prevent ongoing struggles between the branches of government.
While a similar separation of powers exists under Germany’s system,
parliamentary systems tend to place less emphasis on separation of powers, so that
judicial restraint may not be quite so compelling as in the United States. For example,
the German Constitutional Court resolved the problem that welfare recipients might
receive more after tax income from welfare522 than some workers with income equal to
518

Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, supra note 512, 323 U.S. at 105.
Doc v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 (1999).
520
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464,
474 (1982) (plaintiff lacking standing because of no injury to itself from the purported transfer of property
in violation of the establishment clause).
521
Marbury v. Madison, supra note 7, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the Supreme Court’s power to
review legislative acts for constitutionality). Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998)
(ruling “line item veto” to be unconstitutional, Kennedy concurring and discussing the importance of
separation of powers).
522
EStG §3 2. (exempting welfare payments from the income tax).
519
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the amount of a welfare payment by exempting a subsistence minimum, substantially
equivalent to public welfare assistance, from the income tax. 523 In the United States,
Congress has adjusted that problem in part with the limitation on welfare benefits in the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 524
The fifth hypothesis may be weaker than the other hypotheses. Under the
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court’s interest in preserving equality in taxation across
state borders does not appear to have diminished. 525 On the other hand, the Court
increasingly tolerates small, level fees and taxes that, on equality principles, should be
greater for taxpayers who use state resources more than others. 526 The greatest number
of constitutional tax decisions in both federal and state cases527 concentrates itself in the
late 1920s through 1940, approximately. As the Court matured in its approach to
taxation, taxpayers enjoyed fewer successes, although the number of successes was quite
small even earlier. And the Court reversed its position on at least two issues: retroactive
taxation 528 and federal taxation of state payments. 529 Whether the German Constitutional
Court will continue its judicial activism in taxation as its body of tax decisions grows or
not remains an open question.

523

BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, 2d Senat), supra note 123, discussed in text accompanying note
supra 381.
524
P.L. 104-193 (104th Cong, 1st Sess., August 22, 1996).
525
Discussion supra Part 3D.
526
Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. PSC, supra note 280, 125 S. Ct. 2419 (2005).
527
Data exists for the federal cases, supra notes 155-157. The state cases are an unscientific estimate.
528
Supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
529
Supra Part 3E.
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Appendix
A Note on Regressivity and the Income Tax Exemption/Welfare Benefit of a Subsistence
Minimum
Under the German system, the combined turnover tax and income tax tends to be
regressive at middle incomes but not at the lowest incomes. This characteristic is easy to
illustrate through a simplified example. Assume that there is a flat rate turnover tax of
16% on all goods and services, including rent, but each taxpayer is exempt from the
income tax on an amount equal to the subsistence minimum of €100. The statutory
subsistence minimum is the cost per person of basic necessities – food, clothing,
transportation and housing – grossed up to include the turnover tax that is an embedded,
rather than an add-on, tax unlike U.S. sales taxes. Hence basic necessities cost
approximately €86.20 and the tax on those necessities is approximately €13.80. On a
pre-tax basis, the subsistence exemption amount applicable to all taxpayers is €86.20.
Individuals whose incomes are less than €100 receive a welfare payment to increase their
incomes to €100. Assume further that the minimum income tax rate is 20% and, given
the steep progressivity in rates, assume a two bracket system with the higher rate of 48%
on incremental Euro incomes over €300.
All taxpayers pay €13.80 of their first €100 income in combined turnover and
income tax. A taxpayer with any income in excess of the subsistence amount pays at
least 20% combined tax, even if he or she invests every Euro over €86. Accordingly, at
the lowest incomes, the turnover tax allows no regressivity because no taxpayer will pay
less than 13.8% tax on each Euro.
However, taxpayers with incomes over €100 may experience regressivity as
income increases. For example, compare two taxpayers with incomes of €1000 and
€2000 respectively who consume the first €1000 of income and invest any income over
€1000:
€1000
1. 13.8% turnover in 1000
= €138
2. income tax @ 20% on 200 = € 40
3. income tax @ 48% on 700 = €336
Total
= €514
As % of €1000 total income = 51.4%

€2000
1. Steps 1. – 2. are same =
€178
2. income tax @ 48% on 1700 = €816
Total
= €994
As % of €2000 total income = 49.6%
And this would drop to 48.3% at
€10,000.

The regressivity begins to emerge at €1100 and becomes more pronounced as the
income disparity increases.
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